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FROM YODER TO YODA: MODELS OF
TRADITIONAL, MODERN, AND POSTMODERN
RELIGION IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Rebecca Redwood French*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court and its commentators have been struggling for over a
century to find an adequate definition or characterization of the term "religion" in
the First Amendment.! It has turned out to be a particularly tricky endeavor, one
that has stumped both the Court and its commentators. By the 1990s, a significant
section of the academy has given up on the endeavor entirely, others have declared
that looking for a single definition that gives the essential characteristics of religion
is not useful, and a third group has turned to a wealth of interdisciplinary sources.
The appearance of deep incoherence in the religion-related decisions by the Court
in the past decade is often cited as the reason for the continuing move to definition
in the legal academy. 2 In 1993, Congress took the unusual step of setting out some
of its own thoughts on the subject in the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act,3
which was struck down by the Court at the end of its 1997 term in City of Boerne v.
Flores.
4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I would like to thank
Curt Bradley, Emily Calhoun, Richard Delgado, K.K. DuVivier, Sarah Krakoff, Bob Nagel,
Dale Oesterle, Kevin Reitz, Pierre Schlag, and Steve D. Smith for their thoughts on this
article. Charlie Bums, Victoria Garcia, Tony Hanson, Kelly Masterson, Susan Spaulding,
and Kay Yorty provided invaluable research and editing aid.
1. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;..." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
The first consideration of the term "religion" by the United States Supreme Court was in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 'The word 'religion' is not defined in the
Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more
appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision
was adopted." Id. at 162.
2. See infra notes 10-14.
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. 1993)).
4. City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). See discussion infra part V.
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This Article takes an entirely different approach. Based on an analysis of
the actual language used by the Supreme Court to characterize religion, this Artidle
argues that the Court takes a common-sensical approach to each religion brought
before it. The Justices as a unit look at the particular fact pattern of the religion
case and characterize it in a way that is close to both the popular culture and the
scholarly views of religion of the period. As a consequence, the opinions of the
Court are in large part determined by the stereotypical characterization presented to
the Justices of the particular religion involved.
In one sense, this is not a particularly surprising finding. The Justices are
members of society, and "religion" is not formally defined in the First Amendmehit.
In another sense, however, this form of analysis is unusual because it bypasses
most of the current legal academic discussion in this area. It is not based on either
the legal distinctions between free exercise and establishment clause jurisprudence
or on the usefulness of the three-pronged test that animates both the case law and
the legal commentary. Instead, this form of analysis asks whether the members of
the Court find this particular religion to be a traditional religion, a modern
citizenship religion, or a New Age postmodern religion.
A. The Current Incoherence of Religion Clause Jurisprudence
Such a leap into subtextual model-building and analysis would seem
foolhardy were the legal scholarship in this area more coherent.5 A brief history of
the Court and the academy's approach to these issues is necessary at this point to
explain the current incoherence and the need for a new approach.
In its religion clause jurisprudence, 6 the Court understandably has been
5. There have been other calls for a more complex view of the religion clause.
For example, Alan E. Brownstein in Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 173 (1990), states that "[a] new approach is required that forthrightly
describes the multifaceted nature of religion itself...."
6. A brief overview of religion clause jurisprudence is necessary to provide a
background for the current claims of doctrinal incoherence and the arguments over
definition. In the area of doctrine, the Court has divided the clause into two separate areas,
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. A belief-conduct dichotomy in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), was the first major doctrinal position taken
by the Court on the Free Exercise clause, and it remained intact for over fifty years through
its decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), which applied the Frde
Exercise clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1963, in Sherbert P.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), the Court signaled that it was switching to a new
balancing test, the burden placed on the citizen's religious liberty versus the state's
compelling interest in regulation. Through the 1980s, claimants under the Free Exercise
clause generally lost as the courts found most claims to fall into special exemption
categories such as the military, prisons, and federal lands. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.$.
693 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981). But see Thomas v. Review Bd. df
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
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reluctant to provide all-inclusive definitions of religion7 not tailored to the
immediate context of the case before it.8 On a few, now famous, occasions, the
Court has launched into larger statements about the nature of religion in the United
States ('"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being..." 9) but such expositions are usually understood as rhetorical buttressing for
a proposed test to be used by the federal courts. Academic commentators have
written a host of articles proposing, commenting on, and decrying definitions of
religion. 10 Some argue that we need a single, specific definition; Jesse Choper, for
example, has proposed a belief in "extratemporal consequences" as the sign of a
religious consciousness." Some state that we need a particular type of definition-
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). In
1990, the Court shifted to a neutrality test in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). Reacting strongly to the Court's position, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in 1993, rejecting the new neutrality test and requiring the Court to return
to the balancing test language of Sherbert. In its 1997 term, the Court used separation of
powers reasoning to reject this statute as exceeding congressional power.
In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court began with a strict separation
theme, Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), moved on to
an accommodation theme, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and then in the early
1960s to a neutrality test, School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963). In 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the Court
enunciated what has become the well-known three-pronged test for neutrality under the
Establishment Clause-secular purpose, secular effect, and minimal entanglement.
Although it has not been overruled, the Lemon test has been roundly criticized and ignored
in later opinions. See, e.g., Church of the Lukuni Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S.
384 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
7. The Court currently appears to be taking a stance against a singular test in
the area of religion that could be understood as a stance against a singular, all-inclusive
definition. For example, in her concurrence in Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 718 (1994), Justice O'Connor states that "a single test, a Grand Unified Theory
that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause..." should not be
the approach of the Court.
8. "Context" is used in two senses here. In the first sense, it refers to doctrinal
contextualization: context means the particular half of the religion clause-Free Exercise or
Establishment-into which the case falls; the subject matter of the case itself; the current
tests, statutes, and precedents that apply in the area. The second sense of context refers to
the social, historical, political, legal, and religious landscape in which the case occurred. In
this sense, creating a definition of religion that works for a Utah Territorial Court in the late
1870s will be different from creating a definition for a draftee in the 1960s, United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), or a Native American who uses peyote as a part of his church
services in the 1990s, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
10. A recent review of the law review material on definitions of religion is in
Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFsTRA L. REv. 309
(1994).
11. Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 579, 597-601. He also outlines the nine criteria that an adequate definition should
have including being specific and understandable, fulfilling the several goals of the religion
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a functional or analogic or criterion-based or statutory approach to religion
12 -
while others argue that a single definition is not possible or advisable. 13 Other
scholars have begun to use interdisciplinary sources from anthropology, sociology,
psychology, and religious studies to create definitions.
14
clause, and encompassing what we generally think of as religious. See also Jesse H. Choper,
Dangers to Religious Liberty from Neutral Government Programs, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
719 (1996); and The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty,
70 NEB. L. Rv. 651 (1991). Examples of other proposed unitary definitions are the
"ultimate concern" definition from United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965),
which has been advocated in some law reviews, for example, M. Elizabeth Bergeron, "New
Age" or New Testament?: Toward a More Faithful Interpretation of "Religion," 65 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 365, 371-85 (1995). For the "non-rational, transcendent reality" definition,
see Craig A. Mason, Note, "Secular Humanism" and the Definition of Religion: Extending
a Modified "Ultimate Concern" Test to Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools and
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REv. 445 (1988). Laurence H. Tribe
weighed in for a two-fold definition of religion, one for the Free Exercise Clause and one
for the Establishment Clause in the first version of his casebook, AMERICAN
CONsrrTuroNALLAw § 14-6, at 828 (1st ed. 1978), but then rejected the idea as "a dubious
solution" in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1186 (2d ed.
1988).
12. For functional definitions, see Ben Clements, Note, Religion and the State,
100 HARV. L. Rv. 1606, 1623-24 (1987); Note, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 532 (1989). For an analogic
approach, see Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L.
REv. 753, 757-58. For criterion-based definitions, see Choper, Defining "Religion" in the
First Amendment, supra note 11, and Feofanov, supra note 10. See also Judge Adams'
criterion-based test in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) and Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d. Cir. 1981). For a statutory definition, see the IRS
14-point test for a church, see Jerome Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax
Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CAm. LAW. 301, 304 (1978); and Bruce J. Casino,
"I Know It When I See It": Mail Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a
Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 113 (Sum. 1987).
13. Freeman states that the search for a singular definition is impossible because
there are no common traits shared by all religions. George C. Freeman, The Misguided
Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1548, 1565
(1983). While a single definition is arguably not possible, more than one definition also
presents difficulties. One of the first to make this point was Justice Rutledge who,
dissenting in Everson, stated that the term religion in the First Amendment "does not have
two meanings." Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947).
Judge Arlin Adams makes a similar point in Malnak, 592 F.2d at 211-12. As to the fact that
the Court has avoided defining religion, Smith considers this advisable. "One might wisely
hope that this situation will continue." Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 266, 298 (1987).
14. See James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the
Definition of "Religion," 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995); C. John Sommerville,
Defining Religion and the Present Supreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (1994).
Sommerville states that "[flor purposes of my historical study I distilled a definition of
religion from standard anthropological and sociological treatments, to see religion as that
which gives access to supernatural powers or to the presence of such powers." Id. at 171
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More recently, there has been a move from articles that focus on a specific
definition or case decisions to general topics such as the appropriateness of
religious beliefs in legal decision-making and the use of personal religious
narratives. A fairly new group has begun to coalesce at conferences-Blumoff calls
them the "New Religionists," while Teitel calls them the "Critical Religion
Theorists"-to speak and write about the injection of religion into legal
discourse. 15 Addressing liberalism and the lack of religion in the public sphere,
their scholarly arguments take several forms: the increasing secularity of the public
sphere as general morals decline, 16 secularity as an insufficient basis for making
political decisions, the problems with the increase of the administrative state into
the realm of religion,18 the exclusion of religious or moral discourse from the law,
19
our diminished understanding of religion,20 the lack of a holistic viewpoint,
21 and
(emphasis in original). Daniel 0. Conkle has divided religious traditions into three
procedural types: fundamentalists, religious modernists and religious reconcilers in terms of
their orientation toward society, law, and politics. He concludes that religious reconcilers
will be the best at reintroducing religion into legal discourse. See Daniel 0. Conkle,
Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious
Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1993/1994).
15. Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New Religionists' Newest Social Gospel: On the
Rhetoric and Reality of Religions' "Marginalization" in Public Life, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1 (1996); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 747, 754 (1993). Another scholar cites both Stephen Carter and President Clinton
for the "new infusion of religion into American politics," pointing out that Clinton has
stated publicly that he likes Carter's book, THE CuLTuRE OF DISBELIEF, and has "promoted
[it] almost shamelessly." Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in
the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 348, 350 (1995).
16. Hon. Arlin M. Adams, Recent Decisions by the United States Supreme Court
Concerning the Jurisprudence of Religious Freedom, 62 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1581, 1598
(1994). Adams cites Harold Berman for the proposition that religion is necessary to the
foundation of the state. "People will desert institutions that do not seem to them to
correspond to some transcendent reality in which they believe-believe in with their whole
beings, and not just believe about, with their minds." (emphasis in original) (citing HAROLD
J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 73 (1974)).
17. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some
Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019 (1990), and Kent Greenawalt, Religious
Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. Rv. 352, 398 (1985). See also MICHAEL J.
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991) (arguing for the connection between the religio-moral
consensus and political values such as human rights).
18. See Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEG. IssUES 407 (Fall 1996) (arguing that the government should not judge religious
practices or tenets).
19. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL.
L. REv. 753 (1984); R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?
27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 147 (1993).
20. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as
a Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977 (arguing for "religion as a hobby" thesis).
21. See Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom
Language of the Constitution, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 672 (1992).
54 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:49
even discussions of the political and religious views of Justices.22 There has also
been a strong liberal response to the New Religionists restating the basic principles
of neutrality, equality, and religious liberty.
23
Amid all this activity by the legal community, there continues to be an
unease about the current Court's decision-making in the area of the religion
clause.24 The legal academy perceives a deep incoherence in both the structure and
the language of the Court's written decisions, 25 as well as -little adherence to
precedent 6 and deep contradictions in doctrinal analysis.27 Scholars moan that the
22. See Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 1047 (1990).
23. A central statement of this position is by Kathleen Sullivan:
The correct baseline, then, is not unfettered religious liberty, but rather
religious liberty insofar as it is consistent with the establishment of the
secular public moral order. On this view, the exclusion of religion from
public programs is not, as McConnell would have it, an invidious
'preference for the secular in public affairs.' Secular governance of
public affairs is simply an entailment of the settlement by the
Establishment Clause of the war of all sects against all.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 198-99
(1992). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious
Freedom, 74 Tx. L. REv. 577, 609 (1996) (criticizing one New Religionist's "inability to
recognize the equality of persons as the secular value at the core of religious liberty...");
Eisgruber, supra note 15, at 347.
24. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233 (1989); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and
Compromise in the First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1984);
Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution; The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViL. L. REv. 3 (1978-1979); John H. Mansfield,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72
CAL. L. REv. 847 (1984).
25. In the area of religion and law, the Court's use of multiple opinions has
become legion. See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 510 U.S. 1307
(1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). For examples of opinions not speaking to
each other, see Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics, 23 N. Ky. L.
REv. 629, 631-32 (1996); Rainey, supra note 19.
26. There is much evidence of the Court not following prior standards. For
example, the standard put forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 736 (1976), has been
roundly criticized both by Court members and by the legal academy. New tests have
commonly been proposed in each opinion. O'Connor proposed the "no endorsement" test in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989), while Kennedy proposed a "no
coercion" test in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
Perhaps the most famous recent example of citing opinions that have been
overruled in the area of religion is the case of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990), in which Justice Scalia cites Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940):
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general
law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
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Court has lost all predictability, will not address its own precedents, and is
swerving from one untenable position to another.28 Quotes to substantiate these
points abound. Douglas Laycock has pronounced the religion clause doctrine as
"so elastic.. .it means everything and nothing."29 Justice Scalia has described the
Lemon test as "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried ...." 
30
B. A New Approach through Models
The present incoherence in the opinions and articles on religion invites
new considerations and approaches to the question of the Court's characterization
of religion. Instead of starting with the Court's doctrinal analysis, the research for
this Article began with the language used by the Court to typify different religions.
Taking the entire body of cases available in the area of First Amendment
jurisprudence, the author abstracted and analyzed hundreds of contextualized
quotes characterizing religion.
A basic premise in this approach is that bodies of knowledge are
structured into categories, many of which constitute idealized models. This means
that individuals think and make further categorizations based on idealized
examples of what they "know" to exist in the world, in this case, what they know
about "religions." Hilary Putnam has used the term "stereotype" to describe an
idealized mental representation of a normal case. 31 A stereotype need not be an
discharge of political responsibilities.
Gobitis was overruled by a majority of the Court in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). McConnell suggests that relying on Gobitis without
mentioning Barnette is like relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning Brown v.
Board of Educ. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CH. L. REv. 1109, 1124 (1990).
27. Commentators find too many doctrinal tests and too many definitions used in
combination or in opposition to one another in the opinions of the same case. They
complain about rapid switches in reasoning from one case to the next, often not matched to
the proposed tests and a post-facto, back-up rationale quality to much of the reasoning. In
short, it is difficult for many commentators to discern the direction and reasoning of the
Court. Phillip E. Johnson puts it this way: "Many areas of constitutional law are unsettled,
of course, but in most areas the uncertainty concerns how far the Constitution requires us to
go in a particular direction. In the religion clause area, even the general direction is often
difficult to ascertain." Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817, 819 (1984).
28. The problem of addressing precedents may be changing. In a 1997 term case,
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), the Court directly overturned Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985), in its first paragraph.
29. Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 409,450 (1986).
30. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993).
31. See HILARY PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS. VOL 2 (1975). See also HILARY PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES
(1978); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981).
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actual occurrence in the world nor an accurate representation. For example, the
stereotype of the metal "gold" is yellow, although white and red gold also occur in
nature.
George Lakoff, a scholar in cognitive and linguistic research, has worked
for many years at uncovering the basic categories that organize our thoughts,
perceptions, and speech. Lakoff has expanded the propositional stereotype of
Putnam to allow for more complex representations in each category. 32 Working
directly from language extracts, he includes in his prototype the range of possible
images, metaphors, and meanings connected to a concept. An example is the term
"mother" usually defined as "the person who gives birth." There are many other
meanings to the term such as the genetic mother, the nurturance mother, the
marital mother and the genealogical mother. To determine the real "mother"
intended, we may have to use additional compound expressions such as
stepmother, surrogate mother, adoptive mother, foster mother, biological mother,
donor mother. Thus, this general concept of "mother" can not be defined in terms
of a few necessary and sufficient conditions but instead forms a cluster of several
types of "mothers" each of which is not entirely sufficient. Metaphoric references,
images, representations, and value judgments also attach to these complex
models.
33
After applying the work of Putnam and Lakoff to the Court's statements
on religion, the language was grouped into categories and then grouped into
clusters of types of religion. From these categories, three basic images of religion
emerged-a traditional cosmological religion ('Traditional religion"), a modern
citizenship religion ("Modern religion"), and a postmodern New Age religion
("Postmodern religion"). The author then wrote descriptions of each of these types
based on the abstracts from the cases.34 These descriptions were then checked
against the cases to see if they represented useful models of religion. Their
characteristics were also checked against popular and scholarly models of religion
available during the periods in which the cases were written by the Court.
35
32. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY
(1980); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR (1998); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, Fin, AND DANGEROUS THNS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
33. See LAKoFF, supra note 32, at 68-76. See also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra
note 32; LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 32.
34. For example, the typical "traditional" religion in the Court's decisions was
community-based, devoted to God or a supernatural force, not integrated into the larger
democratic community, and anti-scientific.
35. The scholarly conceptions of religion that inform our legal understandings
are multiple and come from wide array of disciplines; only a few that are pertinent to our
current inquiry will be mentioned here. There are three general types of social models:
evolutionary, bipolar, and ideal type.
The classical evolutionary models of society were superceded by the mid-
eighteenth century work of Giambattista Vico who described four stages for society-the
Bestial condition, the Age of Gods, the Age of Heroes, and the Age of Man. For Vico,
religion was the most important component in determining the stage of a society. See M.H.
FISCH & T.G. BERGiN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO (1944); BENEDETTo
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The basic thesis of this Article, then, is that these prototypes or models of
religion used by the Court in its opinions are central to an understanding of the
Court's interpretation of the religion clause. Unlike current doctrinal analysis, the
models demonstrate a coherent pattern in the Court's opinions. In a case involving
a religion that the Court has depicted as negatively New Age in the past, the
plaintiff carries a much heavier burden.3 6 Statements in the Court's opinions also
indicate just how important the depiction of types of religion are in their decisions.
The Court will often change or adjust the commonly understood image of a
religion or a religious practice so that the opinion will reinforce the Justices'
images of religion.
37
CROCE, TnE PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBAMTISTA VICO (1964). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel's
well-known evolutionary model rejected religion as central to society and instead rooted
evolutionary stages in technology, mode of subsistence, and general political structure. See
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OFTHE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE (1902).
More recently, Robert Bellah, a sociologist of religion, has outlined five different
types of religion occurring along an evolutionary scale: primitive, archaic, historic, early
modem, and modem. His stages are historical, based on the differentiation of religious
symbols, and are not mutually exclusive. See ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS
ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADTIONAL WORLD (1970).
Auguste Comte, considered the founder of modem sociology, focused on the role
of religion in creating personal feelings and social solidarity, as well as on the difference
between rational and religious thought, all common themes in current legal discussions. See
AUGUSTE COMTE, SYSTEM OF PosrrivE POLnTY (1875); AUGUSTE COMTE, RELIGION OF
HUMANITY; SUBjECTvE SYNTHESIS (1891); THE PosrrivE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUST COMTE
(Harriet Martinea, trans. 1896). Emile Durkheim drew from Comte the idea of a bipolar
structural model of society, a "mechanical society" with shared religious beliefs juxtaposed
to "organic society" with a shared collective conscience. This bipolar opposition has
retained its importance in current times. See EMILE DURKHEIM, TIE DvISION OF LABOUR IN
SoCmTY (1893). Max Weber developed the ideal-types of religion. See MAX WEBER, MAX
WEBER ON LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCiETY (Max Rheinstein, ed. 1954).
36. Each of the three models-the traditional, modem, and postmodem-
appears in the Court's opinions in both positive and negative formulations. For example, the
traditional model has a positive normative weight when it represents an American Quaker in
the founding period-see Justice O'Connor's dissent in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2182-83-but it has a negative weight when it is used to typify the former Hindu
practice of suttee in which a wife is expected to place herself on her husband's funeral pyre
and expire in grief. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). Both images
are derived from the central prototype of a devout population with a strong religious
cosmology. See infra Part H.
37. This is exactly what happened in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Here, the Court was faced with a difficult free exercise
claim concerning a minority religious group. The Santeria religion originated in the
nineteenth century in Cuba as a blend of traditional Yoruba religion and some aspects of
Christianity. A Santeria church, proclaiming, through its priest Emesto Pichardo, its desire
to go public with the practice of animal sacrifice, leased land within the city of Hialeah and
the city council swiftly enacted specific ordinances against ritual animal sacrifice.
Given the Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a
reasonable guess on the Court's position would have been to uphold the ordinance of the
City finding it to be formally neutral under Smith's lowered threshold test-"a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
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The three prototypes of religion used in Supreme Court discourse are
presented in Parts I, III, and IV. In Part II, a description of the Traditional
prototype is given first in a succinct italicized paragraph that presents its basic
features. The current understanding of this transcendent worldview by the Supreme
Court and in the legal academy is followed by a presentation of the Traditional
model in academic non-legal literature and finally in popular culture. Traditional
religion is often the sacred or religious half of the religious/secular dichotomy
presented in much of the current legal and popular literature.
Part Ill presents a Modem image of religious thought and practice as
modeled by the Supreme Court. In legal literature, this is the model that is referred
to as a secular and neutral form of religious expression, practice, or
institutionalization. This is the site for most of the current argument within the legal
academy on the nature of the secular moral public order and the role of religion in
the lives of public officials.
In Part IV, the Postmodem model coincides with religious expression and
practice in a period of more fluid change and malleable identity. The Supreme
Court has been using this model for deciding cases at least since United States v.
Seeger.
38
Part V takes a brief look at the Framer's conceptualization of religion.
The Framer's religion is not included as a prototypical model in this Article
because it does not involve a current religious practice brought before the Court.
Part V suggests that because it is difficult to know the actual intent of the Framers,
their image of religion will remain an area of controversy. This section focuses on
the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,39 a suit challenging the 1993
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and particularly Justice O'Connor's long
dissent.
The Conclusion suggests that an inquiry into these models is the first step
to a coherent understanding of the Court's decisions. It urges a new approach to the
interpretation of the Religion Clause based on the Court's use of models.
H. TRADITIONAL COSMOLOGICAL RELIGION
One of the common views of religion evinced in the case law of the
Supreme Court is religion as a closed traditional cosmological system that
interest." Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531. But the Hialeah decision is interesting because the
Court felt compelled to move beyond doctrinal reasoning to depict the Santeja religion, qua
religion, in a favorable light. Here the Court was under enormous pressure due to two
factors: (1) the passage of RFRA compelled the Justices to demonstrate that they supported
the Free Exercise clause, and (2) Hialeah involved a statute specifically targeting a religious
practice. Justice Kennedy begins this work of changing the popular image of the Santeria
religion at the very beginning of his opinion. We are told four times in the first paragraph of
section I(A) not that the Santeria participants are part of a strange New Age syncretic cult
but that the Santeria are Roman Catholics, use Catholic saint iconography, Catholic
symbols, and attend "the Catholic sacraments." Their extensive animal sacrifice rituals, we
are told, are actually quite normal and have "ancient roots." Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 524.
38. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
39. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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represents a complete worldview for a community. The Traditional model can be
presented in the following hypothetical form.
A. The Traditional Model of Religion
Religion is an all-encompassing, all-embracing worldview that is
generally pre-modern, ancient, and divine. Devotion to a supramundane power or
God(s) and to a centrally accepted canon are essential and a mark of goodness.
With no substantial secular sphere, religious doctrine saturates and integrates
every individual's life, with the cosmos providing a scheme for understanding both
the ordinary world and the universe. Thus, the meaning of symbols and actions
within the ordinary world is prefigured and directly linked to the religious. 40 This
is a mystical, non-scientific, non-commercial worldview. Religious reasoning is
always a higher duty than secular reasoning. Personal identity is completely
framed within and by religion with a concomitant lack of individualism and an
emphasis on hierarchy, position, and community in a population that is relatively
homogeneous.
41
B. The Case Law Defining the Traditional Model
One of the strongest delineations by the Supreme Court of the Traditional
model occurred in Wisconsin v. Yoder,42 a 1972 case stemming from the
convictions under a Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law of Jonas Yoder,
Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy, all members of Amish Churches. After their
children graduated from the eighth grade at the local public school, they stated that
sending their children to high school would expose them "to the danger of the
censure of the church community... [and] also endanger their own salvation and
that of their children."43 In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the Amish
exemplify our traditional "early national life" and have "sought to return to the
early, simple, Christian life de-emphasizing material success, rejecting the
competitive spirit, and seeking to insulate themselves from the modem world.
'"
The Amish emphasize that "salvation requires life in a church community separate
40. In the Traditional model of religion, the meaning of religious symbols is set.
All religious symbols and art are prefigured and predetermined as to their religious
significance, much like the fixed iconography of a stained-glass window as it was
understood in the Middle Ages. Contrast this with the current tentative and fluid
understanding of art typified by the postmodem ironic canvases of Russell Conner, the
layout of WINED magazine, or channel surfing television.
41. In this model, an individual's identity is firmly rooted, traditional, tied to,
and embedded in a place-not self-consciously chosen, fluid, socially constructed, or
manipulable. Personal agency, therefore, is limited to the options available in the religious
woridview. Narrative is structured as God's narrative, a personal religious narrative or
hagiographical narrative. And finally, both community and society are not chosen, they are
dictated by the larger Providential Plan of God in which everything has a natural place and
purpose.
42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Id. at 208.
44. Id. at 210.
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and apart from the world and worldly influence."4 5 They want "a life of 'goodness,'
rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community
welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with,
contemporary worldly society." 46 The Court that they are "productive and very
law-abiding members of society" who "reject public welfare,"47 are reliable, self-
reliant, and dedicated to work:
Their way of life in a church-oriented community, separated from
the outside world and "worldly" influences, their attachment to
nature and the soil, is a way inherently simple and uncomplicated,
albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to conform. Their
rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios and television, their
mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set
them apart from much of contemporary society; these customs are
both symbolic and practical.
48
The rest of the opinion praises the Amish and their "fundamental mode of life'4 9
and characterizes them as a time-tested human experiment and endangered species
whose atechnic lifestyle emphasizes the need for tolerance and pluralism. Burger
upheld the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling that the convictions of the respondents
under Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law were invalid under the Free
Exercise Clause.
Yoder can be understood as the traditional religion case that worked.
However, this exception is well-marked territory in legal discourse. Robert Cover's
classic article, Nomos and Narrative, describes the Amish as the originators of
moral values for pluralistic communities, the site for jurisgenesis. 50 Cover posited
that our common moral universe, which he termed "nomos," is not derived from
nationalistic sentiments but is an essentially cultural activity that takes place in
"communities with a total life-vision." 51 The nomos of a community like the Amish
he termed "paideic"--"a common and personal way of being educated into this
corpus and.. .a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the individual and
his community work out the implications of their law."52 The visionary sacred and
its narratives evolve and are maintained in such communities; from these
traditional communities, moral laws become common law through the process of
jurisgenesis.
45. Id. at 210.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id. at 217.
49. Id. at 210-25.
50. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). See also NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992). Bruce Ackerman uses a
"jurisgenerative eras" approach to explain the three narratives of the Founding,
Reconstruction, and New Deal welfarism periods. This is a different use of the ideas of
jurisgenesis. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.
453 (1989).
51. Cover, supra note 50, at 32.
52. Id. at 12-13.
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Chief Justice Waite in Reynolds v. United States53 introduced the
problems with a closed, traditional system.54 George Reynolds, a Mormon, had
been indicted in the Territory of Utah under a bigamy statute for marrying a second
time, a duty he felt was required by God in a revelation to Joseph Smith, the
founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints. Distinguishing
between religious beliefs ("mere opinion") 55 that should not be touched by the
government and religious actions ("actions which were in violation of social duties
or subversive of good order"), 56 Chief Justice Waite condemned a closed,
traditional religion that allows abominable practices considered offensive to
society5 7 by comparing Mormon polygamy to human sacrifice and wife-burning:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a
sacrifice? Or a wife religiously believed it was her duty to bum
herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be
beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying
her belief into practice?58
The Court found that Mormons engaged in a religious practice that has "always
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe ' '59 and "fetter[ed]"
in a state of "stationary despotism."6 Here a Traditional closed religion is
considered extreme and in violation of normal codes of decency.
The Satmar Hasidic Jewish community in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet61 had requested a statute creating a school
district specifically for their religious community. Justice Souter found their branch
of Judaism to be a Traditional model, but one that, like Mormonism a century
before, was distasteful in its exclusion of the modern world. He found the statute to
fail the test of neutrality after describing their community with the following
language.
53. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
54. Id. at 162. It should be noted that Justice Waite begins his explanation with
originalist arguments and recounts the Virginia Bill for the Teachers of the Christian
Religion, Madison's response, Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom passed
by the Virginia Assembly in 1786 and the resulting First Congress passage of the First
Amendment.
55. Id. at 164.
56. Id. Chief Justice Waite cited Thomas Jefferson's address to the Danbury
Baptist Association for the powerful metaphorical reference to the wall of separation
between church and state and the distinctive dualism for which Reynolds is famous-that
the legislative powers of the Government reach actions only and not opinion.
57. Id. at 167.
58. Id. at 166.
59. Id. at 164.
60. The quote is: "Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal
principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary
despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy." Id. at 166.
61. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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The residents of Kiryas Joel are vigorously religious people who
make few concessions to the modem world and go to great lengths
to avoid assimilation into it. They interpret the Torah
strictly;.. .speak Yiddish as their primary language; eschew
television, radio and English-language publications; and dress in
distinctive ways that include headcoverings and special garments for
boys and modest dresses for girls. Children are educated in private
religious schools.. .where [boys] receive a thorough grounding in
the Torah and limited exposure to secular subjects and, most
girls... [receive] a curriculum designed to prepare [them] for their
roles as wives and mothers.
62
While most of the opinion could have applied directly to the Amish as easily as to
the Satmar Hasidic community, Souter's tone was different. This was a Traditional
closed worldview religion that, in the view of the Court, had gone too far.
In other recent cases, the "stationary despotism" of the Reynolds case
shows up as "fundamentalism." In 1968, Susan Epperson, a high school biology
teacher in Little Rock, Arkansas, was worried about teaching science in her
classroom under a 1928 state statute prohibiting instruction on evolution. In
Epperson v. Arkansas,63 the Court depicted the anti-evolution statute as a "monkey
law" based on "fundamentalist sectarian conviction" which discomforts the
"modem mind."64
In Edwards v. Aguillard,65 the Court considered the negative impact on
children of a traditional religious viewpoint. At issue was the constitutionality
under the First Amendment of Louisiana's Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act of 1982. The
majority cited McCollum for the need to keep religious factionalism out of the
schools: "In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools. ' 66 Citing Epperson, the Court noted that the Creation-Science law
was "a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor that has long
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the literal interpretation of
the Bible."67 For the majority, Justice Brennan stated that the requirements of
62. Id. at 691.
63. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
64. Id. at 101-07 (1968). Citing pamphlets and letters used to promote the
passage of the bill in 1928, Justice Fortas gives an excerpt from the following letter as an
example of closed-minded fundamentalism:
The cosmogeny taught by [evolution] runs contrary to that of Moses and
Jesus, and as such is nothing, if anything at all, but atheism.... Now let
the mothers and fathers of our state that are trying to raise their children
in the Christian faith arise in their might and vote for this anti-evolution
bill that will take it out of our tax supported schools. When they have
saved the children, they have saved the state.
Id. at 109 n.16.
65. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
66. Id. at 584 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 231 (1948)).
67. Id. at 590 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968)).
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secularity and neutrality are fulfilled by a "comprehensive science curriculum," not
by a creation-science class.
68
In the dissent, Justice Scalia stated "the Balanced Treatment Act did not
fly through the Louisiana Legislature on wings of fundamentalist religious
fervor,' 69 or result from "Christian fundamentalist repression." 70 He pointed out the
contradiction of ruling that secular humanism is protected as a "religion" in some
Court cases71 and then depicting it as a neutral non-religion in this case. Justice
Scalia castigated the majority of the Court for inappropriately presuming that the
legislators are mired in a fundamentalist Traditional model of religion.
C. The Legal Literature on the Traditional Model
Except for Cover's visionary article, there appears to be little
understanding of the comprehensive worldview of the Traditional model within the
legal academy. The transcendent life, the life permeated with the sacred in every
object, word, and action, is not easily comprehensible in legal discourse. The
current debate regarding whether or not religious beliefs can be used in political
decisionmaking is illustrative. Rather than beginning with a discussion of the
nature of the Traditional and other models as religious worldviews for different
citizens, the debate centers around an understanding of Traditional worldviews as
somehow fundamentally problematic for legal argument.
An article by John Garvey, entitled The Pope's Submarine,72 is an
example of this current discussion. It outlines the problems confronting then-
Governor of New York State, Mario Cuomo, when asked to speak on abortion in
1984 at Notre Dame University. 73 Garvey, himself a Catholic, compares the
68. Justice Brennan's full comments are:
Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean 'eaching all of the
evidence' with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act does not
further this purpose. The goal of providing a more comprehensive
science curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of
evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science.
Id. at 586.
"In a similar way, teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of
humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of
enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction." Id. at 594.
69. Id. at 619 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that secular humanism is a religion. "In
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961), we did indeed refer to 'Secular
Humanism' as a 'religio[n]."' Id. at 635 n.6.
72. John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DiEO L. REv. 849 (1993).
73. Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality; A Catholic
Governor's Perspective, Address to the University of Notre Dame (Sept. 13, 1984), in 1
NomaE DAME J. L. ETmcs & PUBUC POL'Y 13 (1984). Cuomo became a subject in legal
discourse when, as a religiously motivated public official, the Governor of New York and a
liberal Democrat, he delivered an address at the University of Notre Dame. As Garvey
described Cuomo's speech:
He began by explaining that he accepted the Church's teaching about
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authority of the Catholic church to the authority of a political system in his paper
but is hampered by the necessary framing of the argument in political terms. He
begins the first section with a statement that the traditional religious life is no
longer a serious option in America:
There was a time when people relied upon their religious sense to
help them understand the idea of political authority. This is why
German kings for centuries claimed the title of Holy Roman
Emperor. I think the tables are tamed today. For most of us political
authority is a familiar-even congenial-notion, but it is hard to see
why we should take seriously a claim of religious authority.
74
Garvey tries to argue that "liberal principles.. .should not prevent Cuomo from
acting on his religious belief about the morality of abortion" and that indeed "the
Free Exercise Clause positively encourages it."75 Garvey then states that while the
dilemma between religious and political beliefs rarely arises, when it does, "it
confirms the stereotype of Catholics as citizens with divided loyalties." 76 He
concludes with the claim that "there is no reason to disqualify religious authorities"
as sources of authority. 77 Legal discourse in the United States obviously does
present problems for the citizen and public official committed to a Traditional or
even quasi-Traditional model of religion.
There is also a stronger position against the Traditional model within the
legal academy. Several law review articles evince a desire to eliminate the
Traditional worldview from the discussion as inappropriate because its presumed
intolerance is inconsistent with "the establishment of the secular public order."
These religions are excluded because they will bring on the "war of all sects
against all.",78 This is seen as a possible danger when a New Religionist presents
religion as a different kind of entity or good,79 or speaks of a "Providential Plan" or
a "classical view of Nature" as necessary for the construction of religion.
80
abortion as the rule for his own life. But as a public official he could not
approve a legal prohibition of abortion. Most of New York's citizens
were not Catholics and many of them (indeed many Catholics) disagreed
with what the Church said. An anti-abortion law would be unfair to
them, and ineffective in the way Prohibition was. Cuomo added that he
also favored Medicaid funding of abortions for the poor.
Garvey, supra note 72, at 850.
74. Garvey, supra note 72, at 851.
75. Id. at 872.
76. Id. at 875.
77. Id. at 876.
78. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 23; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 23;
Eisgruber, supra note 15.
79. See generally WINNI'RED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA:
REtuGious DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994).
80. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998).
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D. General Literature and Popular Culture Images
Outside legal discourse, the Traditional model often works in either a
nostalgic or historical mode as the first half of a dichotomy-traditional versus
modem.81 There are many examples of such theoretical dualisms: Jacques Le Goff
on how the Medieval imagination differs from the modern, 82 Stanley Tambiah on
the dichotomy between traditional religious and modem scientific worldviews,
8 3
Brian Tierney on the correct moral conscience of the Medieval period,84 and Talal
Asad on the lack of inner moral order and personal discipline of Medieval religion
in modem religion.8 5 Charles Taylor has referred to a Traditional sensibility as "the
doctrine of correspondences" in which a person lives in a world of "publicly
understood subjects of divine and secular history, events and personages that had
heightened meaning, as it were, built in to them."
86
In the evolutionary scheme Robert Bellah, "historic religion" is the closest
to the Traditional model. Historic religions are characterized by transcendentalism,
81. Many of the current formulations of traditional society versus modem society
are derived from Emile Durkheim, who was heavily influenced by Auguste Comte, the
originator of sociology. See COMTE, supra note 35. Starting with the premise that law is at
the heart of society because it reproduces the principle forms of social solidarity, Durkheim
worked with a bipolar structural model. At one pole is "Mechanical Society" with little
specialization, repressive and harsh physical punishments, and a shared totality of religious
beliefs. It is contrasted with "Organic Society," a heterogeneous, specialized society with
penal and restitutive sanctions and a common collective conscience created to bind the
group together, similar to Comte's notion of consensus. This bipolar model is replicated in
many of the discussions of closed fundamentalist religious viewpoints or negative versions
of Traditional, as opposed to secular consensual viewpoints, in modem legal and political
theory. See EMILE DURHEim, THE DIvISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., New
York Free Press, 1984); EMILE DuRKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (Stephen
Lukes ed. & W.D. Halls trans., 1895); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE
RELIGIOUS Lim (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915). See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, EMILE
DuRKHEim (1979).
It should also be pointed out here that several authors have referred to
postmodernism as a return to the traditional, the sacred, the particular, the irrational, the
emotional, the mystical, and the magical. See PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 148-49 (1992). See also
MADAN SARUP, IDENTITY, CULTURE AND THE POSTMODERN WORLD (1996). Postmodern
religion is not a return to the Traditional model of cosmologically integrated religious
experience although it may be a return to Traditional sensibilities. It is more likely that this
is a form of Postmodem. See infra Part V.
82. JACQUES LE GOFF, MEDIEVAL IMAGINATION (1988).
83. STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF
RATIONALITY (1990).
84. AUTHORITY AND POWER: STUDIES ON MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT
PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN ON HIS BIRTHDAY (Brian Tierney & Peter Linehan eds.,
1980); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300 (1964); BRIAN
TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650
(1982).
85. See TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF
POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993).
86. CHARLES TAYLOR, THB ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991).
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universalism, religious action as necessary for salvation, the idea of the flawed
nature of humankind, and a new conceptualization of the self. Examples of this
form of religion include early Buddhism, Medieval Christianity, early Judaism, and
early Islam. Echoing the tension described by Garvey as "divided loyalties,"
historic religions legitimate and reinforce the social and political order at the same
time that they create tension due to the new religious elite.
8 7
The Fundamentalism Project of Martin Marty and Scott Appleby at the
University of Chicago is another example of a non-legal academic approach to the
phenomenon of Traditional religion. In several large volumes, they have collected
essays that meticulously describe individual cases of religious fundamentalism
around the world.8 8 In the conclusion to their first book, the editors recognize that
modem religious fundamentalism, as discussed in Epperson and Edwards, is a very
complex phenomenon. Marty and Appleby see fundamentalist movements as
arising in "times of crisis, actual or perceived ' 89 and employing both modem and
traditional forms selectively, but, strikingly, as having a greater "affinity to
modernism than to traditionalism."
' 9
In books and media for a more general audience, the virtuous side of the
Traditional model at times has been transformed into "real religion" and has been
87. "Whether the confrontation was between Israelite prophet and king, Islamic
ulama and sultan, Christian pope and emperor, or even between Confucian scholar-official
and his rule, it implied that political acts could be judged in terms of standards that the
political authorities could not finally control." ROBERT BELLAH, supra note 35, at 35.
Bellah's two preceding models of religion are primitive and archaic. Primitive religion,
typified by the Australian Aborigines, is "oriented to a single cosmos; they know nothing of
a wholly different world relative to which the actual world is utterly devoid of value." Id. at
23. Archaic religion
includes the religious systems of much of Africa and Polynesia and some
of the New World, as well as the. earliest religious systems of the ancient
Middle East, India and China. The characteristic feature of archaic
religion is the emergence of true cult with the complex of gods, priests,
worship, sacrifice, and in some cases divine or priestly kingship. The
myth and ritual complex characteristic of primitive religion continues
within the structure of archaic religion, but it is systematized and
elaborated in new ways.
Id. at 29.
88. See THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT, FUNDAMENTAUSMS OBSERVED (Martin
E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds,, 1991); FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMINO
THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, AND EDUCATION (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds.,
1993); FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING PoLtrics, ECONOMIES AND
MrrANCE (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993).
89. THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT, supra note 88, at 822.
90. They define modem religious fundamentalism as having the following
characteristics: a comprehensive religious worldview as "an irreducible basis for communal
and personal identity," "revealed truth as whole, unified and undifferentiated," literalism
and "extremism," the repudiation of "secular-scientific notions of progress and gradual
historical evolution," "dramatiz[ation] and even mythologiz[ing] their enemies," protection
of 'the group from contamination" to maintain purity, "missionary zeal," and "charismatic
and authoritarian male leaders." THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT, supra note 88, at 817-27.
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contrasted with our current degenerate times. For example, David Klinghoffer
defines real religion-in contrast to kitsch religion-as a transcendent experience
of God created through orthodoxy, faith in the truth of God, moral obligations,
strict education, discipline, standards of conduct, and dedication to a religious
life.91 On the other hand, religious cults created around figures such as Jim Jones,
92
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh,93 David Koresh,94 and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman95
have come to typify the vices of the Traditional closed model.
When considering the Traditional model as a national system, Americans
tend to view it sympathetically in certain cases (such as the Government-in-Exile of
the Dalai Lama of Tibet) and negatively in others (such as the government of Iran
under the Ayatohlah Khomeini). This reiterates the ambivalent images of the
Traditional model reflected in Supreme Court thinking, both the nostalgic picture
of the self-reliant, ethical community operating under a Providential Plan and the
closed, dogmatic, intolerant religious quasi-state.
91. David Klinghoffer, Kitsch Religion, in DuMING DOWN: ESSAYS ON THE
STRIP MINING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 258-60 (Katharine Washburn & John F. Thornton
eds., 1996). Klinghoffer addresses the question of the modem mode of religiosity and points
out that "eviscerating discipline ...isn't necessarily hazardous to the health of a religious
body," given that the fastest growing sects in the USA are Southern Baptists, Mormons,
Orthodox Jews, and other traditionalistic groups. Id. at 257.
92. Jim Jones was the leader of the People's Temple cult, consisting primarily of
U.S. citizens, which built a community known as Jones Town in Port Kaituma, Guyana. In
1978, a group of defectors was ambushed by People's Temple members. Four of the
defectors, as well as a California congressman who was assisting them, were killed. Later
that day, Jones and 912 of his "disciples" committed mass-suicide. See Howell Raines, Lane
Sees "Master Plan" by Cult for Political Murders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1978, at A17.
Like other leaders of cults, Jones controlled his followers by isolating them from the outside
world. See JAMES RESTON, JR., OUR FATHER WHO ART IN HmLL: THE Lim AND DEATH OF JIM
JONES (1981).
93. Shree Bhagwan Rajneesh (posthumously known as Osho), who was deported
from the U.S. in 1989 and died in 1990, was an Indian gum who founded a community first
in Poona, India and later in Antelope, Oregon. Revered by many as a profound spiritual
teacher, in the U.S. media he "became notorious for his teachings of free love and 'cosmic
orgasms."' Alastair Percival, Trial Shame of Women Who Followed Rolls-Royce Guru,
Press Association News File, Home News Section, July 29, 1995. Rajneesh owned 85
Rolls-Royces, "preferring to ride in a different car every day." Peter Applebome, Guru's
Rolls-Royces Fetch Top Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1986, at CIO.
94. David Koresh was the leader of a Branch Davidian religious commune in
Waco, Texas. Koresh allegedly incited his followers to commit mass suicide during a stand-
off with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in April, 1993. He had a very negative image in
the media and was described as a "sexually predatory messiah." Geoffrey Parker, True
Believers, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at 26, quoting FEL.PEFERNANDEZ-ARMESTO & DEREK
WILSON, REFORMATIONS: A RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE WORLD
1500-2000 (1997).
95. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman is the Islamic fundamentalist who incited the
World Trade Center bombing in New York. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Sheik in Court Denies
Terror Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at Al. The "Islamic fundamentalist
cleric...whose preaching attracted some of the World Trade Center suspects...." N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 24, 1993, at 25.
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III. MODERN CITIZENSHIP RELIGION
The most common view of religion evidenced in the Supreme Court case
law is the Modem model. Most closely associated with our understanding of the
role of religion in modem democratic nations during the twentieth century, it is
summarized in the following hypothetical form.
A. The Modern Model of Religion
Religion is a private affair and privately celebrated and it takes place in
and through generally recognized institutions.96 Religion is social; it provides for
the socialization of children into moral values; it connects one to the community
and provides counseling in time of stress and family need. Morality, meaning, and
value through religion are reflected in one's daily life and through one's family
and religious community. Scientific methodology, technology, and materialist
concerns are compatible with religious views and are the primary
conceptualization in the public sphere instead of religious cosmology. There are
many different religions within the nation-state, and for this reason, respect and
tolerance for other religions is basic to the perpetuation of each individual
religion.97 The State is inclusive and tolerant, anti-dogmatic and protective of
public discussion and religion against coercion. All public spheres are secular
such that religion should rarely enter into the political or commercial order or the
academic and intellectual order.
B. The Case Law Defining the Modern Model
Wisconsin v. Yoder,9" discussed in the last section, provides an entry into
some of the core concepts of the Modem model. As one of the few successful free
exercise challenges decided by the Court,99 it contrasted the hardworking, simple,
96. This Modem model of religion in a democratic nation-state emphasizes the
private, institutional, and majoritarian nature of religion rather than the all-embracing
religious worldview of the Traditional model. There is no revelation of the divine
Providential Plan here unless it is privately expressed. No longer tied to the cosmology of
God or a transcendent reality, science and the scientific method define reason as it is
commonly understood.
97. An individual's identity within this model is rooted in the secular nation,
defined by narratives of individual merit and occupational achievement. Art and media
symbols without significant religious iconography constitute the visual field. Community
has become modem networks that aid individuals in times of stress and family need, with
religion as one among competing network systems.
98. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
99. See also Sherbert v. Vemor, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding the right of a
Jehovah's Witness not to work on her Sabbath); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (upholding right of Seventh Day Adventist not to
work on her Sabbath); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (upholding right of
draft-eligible citizen to qualify for conscientious objector status due to belief parallel to that
filled by orthodox belief in God); Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(upholding right of Church of Latter Day Saints to require employees of non-religious
business to be members of Church).
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intensely communitarian Amish, throwbacks to our historical origins and religious
heritage, with modem-day people1 0° In highlighting this contrast, Chief Justice
Burger outlines for us the components of the Modem social world: individuals and
institutions that are complex, diverse, have technical scientific knowledge, material
success, a competitive spirit and are integrated into national political life.'0°
Modem society is "populous, urban, industrialized, and complex... government
regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more detailed and
pervasive."'12 As their non-participation allows them to fit into modem
"democratic society," Burger states that the Amish are the very image of
"Jefferson's ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman."
' '1 3
The Amish were also praised in Yoder because they did not ask any
benefit from the state and because their religious principles remain outside of the
commercial sphere.1 4 This point is further highlighted in the unsuccessful Amish
cases, such as United States v. Lee.'0 5 Written in 1982 by the same Chief Justice,
Lee contains none of the praiseworthy language of Yoder and no references to the
"early, simple, Christian life" of the Amish. In Lee, Burger described an Amish
man, who requested to be exempted from the responsibility of paying social
security taxes, as a "follower of a particular sect [that] enter[s] into commercial
activity as a matter of choice."'1 6 Not surprisingly, Lee's employees were not found
exempt from the tax.
In the Modem model, religion is not envisioned as to content or form as
much as it is conceptualized as one of many private activities °7 in the open secular
plaza of a democracy that encourages diversity and pluralism. This
conceptualization of religion finds fruition in a classic 1969 case, Walz v. Tax
Commission.08 In Walz, a property owner in Richmond County, New York, sued
to enjoin the New York City Tax Commission from granting a tax exemption to
religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship. Chief
Justice Burger began by pointing out that exemption for religious properties is a
concept "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life beginning with pre-
Revolutionary colonial times"1 9 and can best be understood as a sort of
"benevolent neutrality" 110 that avoids "excessive entanglement"'1 by the
government. However, instead of talking of the importance of the Creator's plan or
100. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
101. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
102. Id. at 217.
103. Id. at 225-26.
104. Id. at 216.
105. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
106. Id. at 261.
107. That religion is a private matter can hardly be contested in the Modem
model. For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971), Chief Justice Burger
stated: " he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual,
family and the institutions of private choice...."
108. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
109. Id. at 676.
110. Id. at 669.
Ill. Id. at 670.
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the essential and necessary nature of religion for the fabric of the society, the Court
described religious institutions as one of several groups that are "beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life" because they are "useful, desirable and in
the public interest."'
' 12
Justice Brennan's concurrence took the argument one step further, by
presenting secular arguments for religion. First, Brennan established that two good
secular purposes weigh in favor of exempting religious organizations: they
"contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of non-religious
ways0 13 and they "uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society."
Next, he declared:
It is true that each church contributes to the pluralism of our society
through its purely religious activities, but the state encourages these
activities not because it champions religion per se but because it
values religion among a variety of private, non-profit enterprises
that contribute to the diversity of the Nation. Viewed in this light,
there is no nonreligious substitute for religion as an element in our
societal mosaic, just as there is no .nonliterary substitute for literary
groups.
114
With Walz, the Court shifted dramatically into a new model of religion. Members
of a Traditional religious community with a traditional worldview would be
shocked at the Supreme Court's equation of religious rituals with the activities of a
reading group.
If Lee and Walz demonstrate the virtues of the Modem model, United
States v. Ballard115 in 1944 depicts some of its problems as perceived by the Court.
Guy W. Ballard, who believed himself to be a medium for an "ascended master"
named St. Germain, created the "I Am" movement with his relatives to solicit funds
for healing and curing diseases. Indicted and convicted for using and conspiring to
use the mails to defraud, the Ballards appealed on the basis of the First
Amendment.116 The case was first remanded and then reversed, with the Court
dismissing the indictment." 7 In Ballard, the Court no longer saw itself as capable
of determining for society at large what constitutes an abominable practice, as it
did in Reynolds and Late Corporation."8 In his dissent, Justice Jackson enjoined
the Court to stay out of the business of "examining other people's faiths," and then
proceeded to comment on the hunger for meaning in the modem world:
112. Id. at 673.
113. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 693 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Ballard 1) (holding that the truth of the respondent's
religious doctrines or beliefs should not be submitted to the jury).
116. Id. at 83, 84.
117. Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) (Ballard I1). See
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (Ballard 111).
118. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Late Corp. of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). In Late Corporation,
the Court referred to polygamy as "abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized
world.... [This barbarous practice.. .[is] a blot on our civilization." Id. at 48-49.
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But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. There are
those who hunger and thirst after higher values which they feel
wanting in their humdrum lives. They live in mental confusion or
moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and moral
support. When they are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism
and confusion follow. The wrong of these things, as I see it, is not
in the money the victims part with half so much as in the mental and
spiritual poison they get.
119
Justice Jackson warned us not to forget that religion is a very different sort of entity
than "the representations of secular fact in commerce."
n
In a 1952 school release-time case, Zorach v. Clauson,1 2 1 Justice Douglas
warns that a complete separation of church and state in a modem democracy cdn
lead to relations between state and religion that are "hostile, suspicious and even
unfriendly." 122 In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter raised another theme, questioning
the "surprising want of confidence in the inherent power of various faiths to draw
children to outside sectarian classes."123 These themes of state hostility to religion,
loss of the special understanding of religion, and the possible decline of religion
and spirituality due to the over-secularization of the public sphere have been
picked up by the New Religionists in their criticisms of current legal discourse.
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia have been the two most vocal critics of the
neutrality and separation aspects of the Modem model of religion. In a dissent in
Wallace v. Jaffree,12 a case concerning an Alabama statute that authorized a
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," Justice Rehnquist looked
specifically at the metaphors used in First Amendment jurisprudence. .He
condemned the wall of separation between church and state as a "metaphor based
on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned,"'25 for, "[a]s its history abundantly
shows.. .nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly
neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or
the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory
sectarian means. 126
In Edwards v. Aguillard,127 the 1987 case that tested the constitutionality
of Louisiana's Creation-Science Statute, the majority represented the Louisiana
legislature as mired in a Traditional worldview. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, made two other arguments pertinent to the Modem model of
religion. First, if the legislators were voting for the act on the basis of their
religious beliefs, this is not an adequate reason for invalidating the act as long as a
119. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 94.
121. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
122. Id. at 312.
123. Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
124. 472 U.S. 38 (1984).
125. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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secular purpose also figured into their vote. Second, he paraphrased the statutory
drafters who believed that teachers are largely influenced by "an entrenched
scientific establishment composed almost exclusively of scientists to whom
evolution is like a 'religion. ' ' 28 Here, he is noting the centrality of science and the
scientific method within modem society.
The Court's use of a Modem model of religion-a religion that fits well in
the secular public sphere as one of many permissible secular activities-creates
problems in the interpretation of the First Amendment. The first problem stems
from the model's inversion of the relationship between the sacred and the secular
spheres. In most Traditional models of religion as well as in the late eighteenth
century, when the Constitution was framed, the sacred realm incorporated and
defined much of the secular realm. In the Modem model, the secular realm defines
the sacred. It is not surprising therefore that the Court has been faced with the
problem of the "pickled past"--that is, defining what is sacred and what is merely
nostalgic. The Court has been asked to make determinations about whether or not
large Christian crosses, menorahs, and creches standing next to Christmas trees on
public property are simply nostalgic renditions of our national heritage or actual
religious symbols.129 This set of secular-sacred decisions has proven particularly
thorny for the Court.
Understanding the First Amendment as applying to a secular public sphere
based in pluralism and secular neutrality presents a second interpretive challenge:
other constitutional arguments from the free speech section of the First
Amendment-such as the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor-will move into
religion clause interpretation.130 As this occurs, the emphasis on the Modern model
will be on the secular sensibilities of individuals, rather than on finding,
emphasizing, or protecting the role of the sacred or the religious individual. For
example, an Orthodox Jewish rabbi denied the right to wear a yarmulke in the Air
Force brought suit against the Secretary of Defense for infringing his free exercise
of religion in Goldman v. Weinberger13 1 and lost. Justice Brennan's dissent
demonstrates this second interpretive issue:
The Government notes that while a yarmulke might not seem
obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to
a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi nor dreadlocks to a
Rastafarian.... As a consequence, in pluralistic societies such as
ours, institutions dominated by a majority are inevitably, if
inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and values of minorities when
these needs and values differ from those of the majority.
132
128. Id. at 624.
129. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995); County of Allegheny'v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S.
668 (1984).
130. See Stephen Carter, Does the First Amendment Protect More than Free
Speech? 33 WM. AND MAR' L. RE v. 871 (1992). See also Douglas Laycook, Freedom of
Speech that is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 793 (1996).
131. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
132. Id. at 519, 523-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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C. The Legal Literature on the Modern Model
The legal academic literature supporting the Modem model is enormous.
Indeed, the Modem model of religion is the standard legal academic model of
religion. The Supreme Court has not presented a strong description of a type of
religion so much as an image of the space that.a religion may occupy in the secular
public sphere as one of many permissible secular activities. This model regards
religion as private and rarely allowed to enter into the political, commercial or
intellectual order because it has a dampening effect on the freedom of others. Legal
scholars writing in this area describe a legal system that embraces religion fully but
does not advocate religion, investigate religious beliefs, or allow religious beliefs
to impinge on important individual rights. And, these scholars insist that a
fundamentalist religious point-of-view, to the extent that it stops the conversation
necessary for an engaged democratic population, should not be promoted.
1 33
In general, the New Religionists legal scholars attack the Modem model.
They complain about the current secularized, scientific, material state for
diminishing the understanding and place of religion in our public sphere.134 They
decry increasing secularity because it has caused a general moral decline. 35 They
reject the large role of the secular state in the daily lives of the general population
and push to bring religious or moral speech back into legal discourse. 36 Many New
Religionists are characterized as adhering to a Traditional model. But the majority
of legal academics support the Modem model, and the oppositional New
Religionists are no different. Even as they adopt these stances, they remain
modem-none of the New Religionists want to join the Amish or live in a truly
traditional integrated worldview.
However, the New Religionists' discussions have addressed a central
question about the modem model; that is, is the Supreme Court's Modern model a
model of religion? This is the line of attack in journals such as First Things,1
37 and
in books such as Stephen Carter's Culture of Disbelief'38 and Steven Smith's
Foreordained Failure.3 9 When New Religionists state that they reject the
diminished place of religion in the modem public sphere and the secularized,
133. For some typical examples of the extensive literature in this area, see Bruce
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989), BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's
DOMINION (1993); Eisgruber supra note 15; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 23; Greenawalt,
supra note 17; Laycock, supra note 29; JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE (1971);
Sullivan, supra note 23, at 198-99; James Boyd White, Talking about Religion in The
Language of the Law, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 177 (1998).
134. See supra notes 19, 20.
135. See supra note 16.
136. See supra notes 17-19, 21
137. FIRST THmNGS is published by the Institute on Religion and Public Life in
New York City.
138. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
PoLrICS TRIVIALIZ RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
139. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTrrTUIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
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scientific and consumerist orientation that has promoted it, they are in large part
bemoaning the lack of content to the Supreme Court's most important model of
religion.
Other legal academics with a philosophical and interpretivist bent have
attacked the Modem model as well. They have suggested that the core ideas of the
secular public sphere have not been sufficiently delineated, 140 that the current
liberal stance is itself a sort of "secular fundamentalism,"' 14 1 and that "here in the
final decade of the twentieth century, the postindustrial processes of
bureaucratization, consumerization, commercialization and mass media saturation
threaten substantially to transform our experience" of religion just as they have
threatened the "marketplace of ideas." 142 Another implicit criticism is the lack of
appropriate reproduction of social and cultural forms-including the socialization
of children-that takes place through the current secularized system. 143
D. General Literature on the Modern Model
In the academic and popular literature, the Modem model of religion is
the standard, and therefore the references to it are vast. It would be neither possible
nor useful to review all of this material. Instead, this section will describe briefly
two insightful theoretical approaches to the Modem model, one from a sociologist
and one from a philosopher.
In 1965, Robert Bellah's essay, Civil Religion in America,144 generated a
huge response and resulted in the creation of a new academic field. 145 In his book,
140. See Pierre Schlag, Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1997).
141. See generally Paul Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. RnV.
1814 (1994).
142. Steven Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas,
64 U. COLO. L. REv. 965, 973 (1993).
143. See, e.g., Noni Maya Stoltzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV.
581 (1993) (discussing in some depth the problems with secular education for minority
religious groups such as the Hassidic Jewish population in the United States). The best
theoretical work on moral and cultural reproduction is by Pierre Bourdieu. See PMRRE
BOURDIEU, OUTLM OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1977); PIERRE
BouRDmu, LA DISTINCTION: CRITIQUE SOCIALE DU JuoEmENr 272-92 (1979).
144. Robert Bellah, Civil Religion in America, DAEDULUS, Winter 1967, at 1-21.
145. Robert Bellah's evolutionary model of religion is also pertinent to the
Court's Modem model. Modem religion according to Bellah is typified by a loss of the
traditional historic symbolization system: "It is indeed an open question whether there can
be a religious symbol system analogous to any of the preceding ones in the modem situation
which is characterized by a deepening analysis of the very nature of symbolization itself."
BELLAH, supra note 35, at 40. The simple social structure of the traditional historic model is
replaced by a social system that is "infinitely multiplex." Id. He credits philosophy, and
particularly the work of Immanuel Kant, with the modem disenchantment with the
traditional metaphysical basis of all religions and a regrounding of religion in "the structure
of ethical life rather than in a metaphysics claiming cognitive adequacy...." Id. Bellah states
that while many continue in an historic religious symbolization in modem times, 'just as
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The Broken Covenant, he defined "civic religion" as the "religious dimension
found I think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical
experience in the light of transcendent reality."146 He has also written the following
description:
A republic must attempt to be ethical in a positive sense and to elicit
the ethical commitment of its citizens. For this reason, it inevitably
pushes toward the symbolization of an ultimate order of existence in
which republican values and virtues make sense. Such
symbolization may be nothing more than the worship of the republic
itself as the highest good, or it may be, as in the American case, the
worship of a higher reality that upholds the standards the republic
attempts to embody. 147
These ideas of civil religion are now generally understood as a religious-like
attachment to the American state-its myth of origins, concept of chosen people,
salvation through success. In law, it is conceptualized as the deification of the
Constitution and the search for constitutional principles; in academics, it has
resulted in a flourishing of studies on nationalism. Bellah's notion of civic religion
is particularly interesting because it may be the core of the Court's and legal
academic's version of the Modem model. Indeed, the religion at the center of the
Modem model would then be a civic religion, that is, a religion of the state. 148
surely many others have developed elaborate and often pseudoscientific rationalizations to
bring their faith in its experienced validity into some kind of cognitive harmony with the
twentieth-century world." Id. at 42. No church, no group, not even Western Christianity has
a monopoly any longer over man's definitions of his own existence. "Not only has any
obligation of doctrinal orthodoxy been abandoned by the leading edge of modem culture,
but every fixed position has become open to question in the-process of making sense out of
man and his situation." Id.
146. ROBERT BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CvIL RE IGION IN
TImE oF TRLa, 53 (1975).
147. Id. at 176.
148. While Bellah initiated the concept in a 1967 essay, by 1975, in the
concluding chapters of THE BROKEN COvENANT, he finds current American civic religion to
be an empty shell with little internal strength. The end of Bellah's book turns into a
jeremiah (his own term, Id. at xi). He states that civic religion has resulted in "utter
devastation-of the natural world in which we live, of the ties that bind us to others, of the
innemess of spiritually sensitive personality.... If our economic and technological advance
has placed power in the hands of those who are not answerable to any democratic process;
weakened our fanilies and neighborhoods as it turned individuals into mobile, competitive
achievers; undermined our morality and stripped us of tradition...then we must consider
where else to turn." Id. at 143. He laments America's "long love affair with economic
development without adequate attention to anything else." Id. at 149. For Bellah, religion
has become commodified as part of the advance of technical reason and the
commodification of all of American life. From a legal perspective, these do not seem to be
issues particularly well addressed by the courts. But, according to Bellah, the New
Religionists are moving in the right direction to the extent that they are addressing the
"failure of our central vision" Id. at 157 and are engaged in much needed ecumenical
reflections on the creation of "a larger religious and moral context." Id. at 152.
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The philosopher Charles Taylor is another trenchant observer of the
Modem model with both its virtues and vices. 149 Taylor outlines three problems in
modem life that lead to a diminishing of religion: individualism that can become
self-absorbed and lead to fading moral horizons; instrumental reason that can lead
to tremendous scientific and material advance but also loose society from its sacred
structure; and finally, a highly centralized and bureaucratized politics that can lead
to enormous efficiency and yet limits freedom. 150 However, Taylor refuses to be
either a booster or a detractor of contemporary culture and instead sees the current
debate as inarticulate. He states that works like Alan Bloom's The Closing of the
American Mind, 151 which criticizes current social trends, miss the powerful
modem ideal to be "called" to authentic self-fulfillment, including religious self-
fulfillment.' 52 Tracing back to the work of Johann Herder and the Romantics,
Taylor finds that good forms of individual authenticity and self-fulfillment need to
be sensibly articulated. From Taylor's point of view, liberal theorists like Ronald
Dworkin, who espouse neutrality toward religion in a secular public sphere,
eliminate important discussions on the "constitutive ideal of modem culture" and
our religious and moral horizons. 153 Thus, like the New Religionists, both Bellah
and Taylor address the problems with civic religion at the center of the Modem
model of religion and a loss of focus on moral horizons.
IV. NEW AGE POSTMODERN RELIGION
The third model of religion evinced in Supreme Court case law is the
Postmodem model. It is most closely associated with our understanding of the role
of religion in what is termed "postmodem society" in the United States. The
postmodem model of the Court can be summarized in the following hypothetical
form.
149. See CHARLES TAYLOR, THEETHIcs OFAUTHENTICrrY (1991).
150. In his first chapter, entitled "Three Malaises," Taylor outlines these three
problems of modernity in detail. Id. at 2-12.
151. ALAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OFTHE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
152. TAYLOR, supra note 149, at 13-23.
153. Id. at 18. Charles Taylor has used the term "moral horizons" to describe the
background, the horizons that matter from religion, history, nature, society or citizenship
within a group. He argues that to move away from our current "inarticulate debate," we
need a "work of retrieval." Moving from soft relativism and incoherence into real dialogue,
in Taylor's view, requires a non-trivializing engagement with modem ideas of authenticity
and identity coupled with an assessment of "moral horizons." Moral horizons present higher
demands than just "the self," make some options more significant than others, and require
an engagement with the past, the demands of citizenship, and the duties of solidarity. In
Taylor's view, we need to engage in arguments that make a difference, to use coherent
ideals and models in those arguments and to believe that the arguments are more than just
subjective or momentary. For a similar call to a deeper consideration of important social
and religious underpinnings, see Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious
Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672 (1992) and Mary Ann
Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1991).
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A. The Postmodern Model of Religion
Religion is a self-created entity or a self-created identity centered in
spiritualism, power and wisdom. It can be a newly formed institution or religious
movement with a central canon based on a wide variety of ideas ranging from
more traditional religious concepts, such as devotion and faith in God, to new
concepts with central figures and distinct ritual practices not commonly
considered religious. It can also be a deliberately constructed individual religious
identity. Here an individual, in a voluntaristic way, chooses either a particular
religion or parts of religious and other practices, and forges them into a
personalized package of concepts and daily or yearly rituals. These religious
concepts and practices are often uncoupled from their original cultural context.
An individual may experience or create a religious identity more than once during
her or his lifetime.
This third model has two aspects that require a more detailed explanation.
The first is the newly created religion or religious practice-examples are some of
the new Christian cults, 54 Scientology,"5 s and New Age Channeling.156 These are
generally syncretic religious movements, some utopian, some canonical, some
based primarily on new ideas in personal psychology, others formed around the
ideas of a particular person such as L. Ron Hubbard or Sri Aurobindo.
157
154. Examples include Christ Family, the Process Church of the Final Judgement,
the Children of God, the Fellowship for Christian Understanding, and the Foundation
Church of Divine Truth.
155. In 1950, L. Ron Hubbard wrote a book on psychotherapy which became an
international best-seller. Based on this book, he founded the Church of Scientology, a
religio-scientific movement headquartered in Los Angeles. According to Scientology, a
religio-scientific movement, individuals have life energy called "thetan" that is made up of
"MEST"--matter, energy, space, and time. As all experiences are recorded in the mind,
thetans must purge "engrams" or painful experiences from their "reactive" or subconscious
mind to eliminate irrational behavior and achieve good mental health. This therapy takes
place in a highly structured environment with a therapist "auditor" and is expensive. The
Church of Scientology has been prosecuted by the Internal Revenue Service for fraud and
tax evasion. See L. RON HUBBARD, DIANETCS, THE MODERN SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH
(1950).
156. Channeling is "the use of altered states of consciousness to contact
spirits.. .from other times and dimensions." MICHAEL BROWN, THE CHANNELING ZONE:
AMERICAN SPIRrrUALTrrY IN AN ANXIOUS AGE viii (1997). This practice has spread rapidly in
the United States and Europe since the early 1970s. A person who seeks insight into his or
her actions and knowledge about how to make the best decisions in the future turns to a
channel who acts as a vessel for messages from these spirits. The messages are typically in
the form of "affirmations"--"declaration[s] believed to bring about a desired outcome
through repeated performance." Id. at 134. Brown believes that these affirmations are
"rooted in the New Thought movement of the nineteenth century, which asserted the power
of positive thinking to heal illness and create prosperity." Id.
Robert Bellah and his co-authors describe channeling as "therapeutic
contractualism," that is, looking to spirituality to meet personal needs rather than to
determine right from wrong. ROBERT N. BELLAH FT AL., HABrrs OF THE HEART;
INDIVIDUALIsM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1995).
157. See L. Ron Hubbard, see supra note 155. See SRI AUROBINDO, THE LIFE
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The second aspect of this model is the deliberately constructed religious
identity. An example is a person who grew up Southern Baptist, proclaimed herself
an atheist at twenty and has now joined Scientology. Another example is someone
who meditates every morning at a Japanese zendo before work, takes holidays at a
Tai Chi retreat twice a year, is a member of a science fiction club devoted to Yoda
from the Star Wars movies, 58 and celebrates Christmas with his family. This is a
grocery store approach to religion in which each individual fills a customized cart
full of preferred religious options. The uncoupling of certain aspects of religions
from their older, steady state inside a specific cultural and cosmological context is
the first step. Then various parts of a religion-concepts, practices, rituals, emotive
responses, cosmology-are recombined with aspects of other religions to create an
individuated religious life and identity. 59
B. The Case Law Defining the Postmodern Model
United States v. Seeger,16° the first step by the Court into a postmodemist
depiction of religion, concerned the exemption of two young men for conscientious
objection under the 1948 Military Selective Service Act.16' In this Act, Congress
defined religious belief as "...an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not
including] essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code. ' '162 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Clark used analogical
reasoning to equate a belief in God or a Supreme Being to any "sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God." 163 He spoke of "the ever-broadening understanding of the
modem religious community" and then cited Dr. Paul Tillich:
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it,
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any
DIvINE (1940); Si AuROBINDo, TAE HUMAN CYCLE (1949); SRi AUROBINDO, THE
SYNTHESIs OF YOGA (1948).
158. STAR WARS (20th Century Fox, 1977). Yoda is the Star Wars character who
trained the Jedi Knights in the quasi-religious philosophy of "the Force." The key phrase in
the Star Wars trilogy of movies is "May the Force be with you." Arguably, these movies
were successful precisely because of the rise of tolerance for newly created personal
psychology and quasi-religious movements in American life.
159. For the Postmodem religious individual, narrative, agency, and community
are more fluid and less prescribed than in either the Traditional or the Modem models. An
individual creates his or her own combination of religious concepts, practices and rituals
not necessarily related to their original form or cultural context. Personal identity here is
contested, deliberately constructed and changing; one can switch from one tradition to
another several times in the course of one lifetime.
160. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
161. Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 6J, as amended 50 U.S.C. Ap.
§ 456(j) (1948).
162. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 172.
163. Id. at 176. See also id. at 166.
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reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything
traditional that you have learned about God ....164
The religious groups cited by the Court in Seeger remained well-known
institutionalized religions such as the Mennonites, the Society of Friends, the
Amish, Hutterites, Buddhists, and Hindus.
Seeger was followed by Welsh v. United States, in 1970.165 In Welsh,
Elliott Ashton Welsh II appealed a conviction for refusal to submit for induction
into the Army despite a request for conscientious objector status. During a period
of extreme draft pressure for an unpopular war, Welsh chose to describe on his
exemption application his current religious ideas as neither religious nor attached
to any particular religious institution. Justice Black began his opinion in this case
by noting the similarities to Seeger and then proceeded to find Welsh's personal
beliefs "religious" under the statute. 166 Taking the Seeger decision one step further,
Justice Black decided not to be bound by "traditional or parochial concepts of
religion," stating that an essentially political, sociological, philosophical, or
personal moral code is equivalent to-theistic belief:
In resolving the question whether Seeger and the other registrants in
that case qualified for the exemption, the Court stated that "[the]
task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are
sincerely held and whether they are in his own scheme of things,
religious." The reference to the registrant's "own scheme of things"
was intended to indicate that the central consideration in
determining whether the registrant's beliefs are religious is whether
these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in
the registrant's life. 167
Welsh shows the further uncoupling of the term "religion" from an historically
legitimated set of definitional ideas and institutional attachments that centered
around theistic, extra-worldly beliefs and practices. "Religion" has now been
placed on equal footing with all "beliefs [that] play the role of a religion." This
case raises the question of whether activities that "function like a religion" should
be treated as a religion for purposes of the First Amendment.
168
A second indication of the Court's use of the Postmodern model of
religion is the move to individual psychological reasoning as exemplified in Lee v.
Weisman, in 1992.169 Robert Lee, the principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School in
164. Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TILuCH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57
(1948)).
165. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
166. Id. at 335-44.
167. Id. at 339 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
168. Postmodem functionalism makes its entry at just this point: it now becomes
possible to imagine bicycling, for example, as a healthy obsession that will "function as a
religion" in American life.
169. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). This case is also an example of the
multiple opinions now rendered by the Court in religion cases. Justice Kennedy delivered
the majority opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined.
Justice Blackmun filed a concurrence in which Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined.
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Rhode Island decided to invite a member of the clergy to say a prayer at the 1989
graduation. He presented Rabbi Leslie Gutterman with a pamphlet entitled
Guidelines for Civic Occasions which outlined the non-sectarian nature of the
benediction. Daniel and Deborah Weisman sued to enjoin officials of the
Providence public school system from inviting clergy to give benedictions at any
future graduations.
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy stated that the recitation of a non-
sectarian graduation invocation was an officially sanctioned religious activity that
"bore the imprint of the State.' 170 He then turned to psychological reasoning. The
students were subjected to "public pressure, as well as peer pressure" to stand and
"maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction."'171 Rejecting
the argument that these prayers were of a de minimis character, the Court stated:
"Research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are
often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the
influence is strongest in matters of social convention."'172 Being subtly coerced to
pray is a message of exclusion from the open secular plaza of the state. In their
dissent, Justices Scalia, White, Rehnquist, and Thomas made several points. First,
invocations at graduations are part of a "longstanding American tradition of
nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally.', 173 Second, students
who objected could just sit down leaving "absolutely no basis for the Court's
decision. ' 174 Third, the "deeper flaw in the Court's opinion,"'175 lies in its equating
of postmodern psychobabble with the important historical meaning of the
establishment clause as a bulwark against sectarian religious orthodoxy:
"Unfortunately.. .the Court has replaced Lemon with its psycho-coercion test,
which suffers the double disability of having no roots whatever in our people's
historic practice, and being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for
psychotherapy itself.' 176 Fourth, the dissent laments the Court's use of victimology
reasoning saying that "it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the
opportunity, and indeed the encouragement, for people to [join in prayer]
voluntarily.'
177
While the Court uses the Postmodern model to protect the individual and
an individually constructed religious identity in Seeger, Welsh, and Lee, it more
Justice Souter filed a concurrence in which Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White and Thomas, filed a dissent.
170. Id. at 590.
171. Id. at 593. Daniel 0. Conkle singles out Justice Kennedy's psychological
approach in Lee and states that it was pragmatic and "honored the spirit of Lemon." See
Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 865, 882 (1993).
172. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
173. Id. at 632.
174. Id. at 637-38.
175. Id. at 640
176. Id. at 644.
177. Id. at 646. For further critiques of this case, see Keith A. Fournier, In the
Wake of Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the Psycho-Coercion Test is More
Bitter Still, 2 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox
Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 123 (1992).
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often than not finds fault with newly-formed Postmodern religious institutions or
religious movements. In these cases, the Court perceives something it considers
false and non-majoritarian in the constructed nature of the religion and therefore
declares that it should not be afforded protection under the First Amendment. For
example, in his concurrence in Welsh, Justice Harlan plainly marks this ground by
defining "bad" religions as "cults that represent schools of thought... [and] are
without formal structure or are, at most, loose and informal associations of
individuals who share common ethical, moral or intellectual views. '178 They are
distinct from "conventional religions that usually have an organized and formal
structure and dogma and a cohesive group identity, even when nontheistic."
179
The Court often views the Church of Scientology as just such a non-
majoritarian postmodern cult. In Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,1 8 0 a 1989 appeal from a U.S. Tax Board decision by a member of the
Church of Scientology, Justice Marshall's description of the church emphasized its
postmodern and commercial aspects: Scientology was founded in the 1950s, has
branch churches called "franchises," uses electronic devices to monitor "spiritual
difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer session,"
charges "fixed donations" also known as "prices" for a schedule of graduated
"training sessions" and offers discounts for advanced payments.181 This is not the
language of the Traditional Amish model, reflecting an anti-science, anti-
technology life of goodness and inner morality, nor is this the Modem religion that
stays out of commercial affairs and does not mix science and religion. This is
paying to maintain "inflow" and "outflow" to achieve spiritual balance-pure
Postmodern religion. Justice Marshall also presented other factors that indicate a
Postmodern religion: the lack of a congregational aspect, mediated promotion of
the religion, the reciprocal nature of spiritual exchanges, commercial purpose,
commercial promotion, and required payments as a quidpro quo.182 In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the members of the Court may be using
different models of religion: 'This is not a situation in which a governmental
regulation 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions,' .... Rather, it involves the differential application of a standard based on
constitutionally impermissible differences drawn by the Government among
religions. 183
From the Court's perspective, the Native American religion cases 184 are
also examples of Postmodern religions. In each of these cases-concerning,
178. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 354 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
179. Id. Justice Harlan is, perhaps, also making a distinction here between a
Traditional religious cult that is a closed traditional religion as typified in Reynolds and a
Postmodem religious cult, a postmodem amorphous "loose and informal associations of
individuals who share common ethical, moral or intellectual views." Id.
180. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
181. Id. at 684-86.
182. Id. at 684-86, 691-92.
183. Id. at 712.
184. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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respectively, social security payments, sacred burial grounds and the use of peyote
in a Native American church-the majority of the Court treated Native American
religions as postmodern. The Court's comments all relate to perceived Postmodern
qualities: the religion's newness, 185 the possibility for fraudulent representations to
the government,' 86 the Court's difficulty in discerning a coherent basis for the
religion or religious practice,18 7 and the possibility for the individual to become "a
law unto himself."18 For the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia even outlined what
an acceptable modern majoritarian religion, as opposed to this postmodern Native
American religion, entails: "[T"he 'exercise of religion' often involves not only
belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts,
assembling with others for worship service, participating in sacramental use of
bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of
transportation."18 9 For the Court, Postmodern religions lack a coherent
comprehensible religious tradition or a consistent canon, and feature provisional
moral values and multiple interpretations. While Native American religions are
hardly new, inauthentic, provisional, or New Age in nature, when a Postmodern
model of religion is applied, the Native American party loses.
In summary, when the Court characterizes an individual's behavior as
falling. within the Postmodern model, it is usually to reinforce the religious
activities and choices of that individual as in Welsh. On the other hand, when the
Court characterizes an institution as Postmodern, such as the Church of
Scientology in Hernandez, or the Native American church in Smith, the
complainants lose. Postmodern churches seem to have at least one of several
characteristics that the Court does not like: commercial promotion, the lack of a
congregational aspect, provisional moral values that appear to allow for multiple
interpretations, required payments, or non-majoritarian rituals such as the use of
peyote.
C. The Legal and General Literature on the Postmodern Model
Although legal postmodernism has been the topic of several law review
articles and at least one book,190 the Postmodern version of religion remains largely
185. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696 (noting the plaintiff's "recently developed.. .religious
objection").
186. Id. at 711-12.
187. In his dissent in Lyng, Justice Brennan makes just this point: "In marked
contrast to traditional Western religions, the belief systems of Native Americans do not rely
on doctrines, creeds, or dogmas. Established or universal truths-the mainstay of Western
religions-play no part in Indian faith." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460.
188. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990): 'To make an
individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
rpligious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by
virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself'-contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense." Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1878)).
189. Id. at 877.
190. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEoAL MOVEMENTS (1995). See also Dennis
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unrecognized in legal journals. Law review articles on postmodernism such as
Jerry Frug's Decentering Decentralization,191 which talks at length of the
existential condition of the postmodern subject, do not discuss postmodern
religion. Law review articles on religion, on the other hand, discuss the nature of
religion and its role in the U.S. legal system but do not include postmodern forms
of religion in their discussion. 1
92
The general movement, postmodernism, has been a hot topic in the
academic literature for well over a decade19 3 and postmodern religion has been
described ethnographically in the social science literature. 194 Descriptions of the
characteristics of postmodernity in art, architecture, literature, and the
professions-often primarily attempts to present what is currently happening-vary
enormously, as do scholarly theoretical analyses.19 5 Tony Giddens, an astute social
critic, dates the start of postmodernism to the mid-1960s and connects up
psychological trends such as therapy and victimology to economic and
technological changes such as increasing capital commodification and the growth
of globalized information technology in the last thirty years. 196 Mark Taylor, a
Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminism/Law, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 254 (1992); Pierre Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Winter, supra note 142.
191. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Cm. L. Rv. 253 (1993).
192. While no law reviews have discussed postmodern religion, a few law reviews
have used Tom Wolf s famous quote as an introductory epigram to signal that they
recognize the changing nature of religion in the last twenty years: "Now is a great time for
new religions to pop up. There are people who get religious about jogging, they get
religious about sex.. .health foods.. .ESP, of course, flying saucers, anything is fertile
ground now. There's a new messiah born every day." TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE:
WHAT A LONG, STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN 340 (Jann S. Werner ed., 1987). See also M.
Elisabeth Bergeron, "New Age" or New Testament?: Toward a More Faithful
Interpretation of "Religion," 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 365 (1991); Ben Clements, Note,
Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REv.
532 (1989).
193. Discussions of the nature of postmodernity and comparisons with modem
and traditional societies abound. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF
POSTMODERNrry (1992); TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNrrY (1996);
ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION (1992); DAviD HARVEY, Tim
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE
(1989); FREDERICK JAMIESON, POSTMODERNISM (1991); DAVID SIMPSON, THE ACADEMIC
POSTMODERN AND THE RULE OF LITERATURE (1995).
194. See, e.g., DAVIDVANZANT, LIVINGINTHECHILDRENOFGOD (1991).
195. The key concepts of postmodern analysis in literature are decanonization, the
use of metaphor, and deconstruction of the text. In art and architecture, they are the collage
of former images and styles combined with irony, humor, and an absence of current form. In
social sciences, the key postmodern concepts are a fluid and constructed identity, the use of
narratives, spatial and temporal compression and globalization issues such as diaspora and
violence. See ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART: CONTEMPORARY ART AND THE
PALE OF HISTORY (1997).
196. See TONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTrrY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN
THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991). Giddens introduces what he calls not postmodemity but late
modernity as the period following modernity. He uses modernity "in a very general sense to
refer to the institutions and modes of behavior established first of all in post-feudal Europe
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theorist of postmodern religion, has written several books to try to describe what
theology might be after deconstruction.
97
Many general books take one of two positions-they espouse the new
freedom of social forms in the postmodern era' 98 or decry its problems through a
lens of cultural pessimism.199 Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism:
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations was an initial clarion call to
the importance of psychology in the postmodern search for identity.= A recent
but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their
impact." Id. at 14-15. The nation state is the most prominent form of modernity which is
typified by separation of time and space, disembedding mechanisms which delocalize
particulars, and institutional reflexivity. Id. at 20. The big problem, as Giddens sees it, in
late modernity thinking, is derived from
the centrality of the reflexive project of the self in late modernity
coupled to the contradictory nature of the extension of modemity's
internally referential systems. The capability of adopting freely chosen
lifestyles, a fundamental benefit generated by a post-traditional order,
stands in tension not only with barriers to emancipation, but with a
variety of moral dilemmas.
Id. at 231.
197. See MARK TAYLOR, ERRING: A POSTMODERN A/TIOLOGY (1984); MARK
TAYLOR, ALTARITY (1987); MARK TAYLOR, DISFIGURING ART, ARCHITECTURE, RELIGION
(1992); MARK TAYLOR, HIDING (1998) (discussing the "religious" architecture of Las
Vegas, tattooing, and fashion).
198. In an early work, Robert Bellah had a sanguine and interesting view of the
Postmodem model (calling it a different aspect of the "modem"): "The analysis of modem
man as secular, materialistic, dehumanized and in the deepest sense areligious seems to me
fundamentally misguided, for such a judgment is based on standards that cannot adequately
gauge the modem temper." BELLAH, supra note 35, at 40 (1970). Here, Bellah embraces the
modem human as self-transformative, capable of remaking the world, multidimensional and
newly responsible. As standards of doctrinal orthodoxy and attempts to enforce moral purity
disappear, an individual's search for meaning is not confined to the church in the modem
age. Instead each individual will search for her or his own standard of action, personal
maturity and social relevance. Bellah does not see these changes as indifference and
secularization. Instead, except for holdover religions from the modem period, he finds "an
increasing acceptance of the notion that each individual must work out his own ultimate
solutions and that the most the church can do is provide him a favorable environment for
doing so without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers." Id. at 43-44.
199. For an early discussion of the problems that arise if religion cannot be
distinguished from non-religion see SIDNEY HOOK, RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). See
also BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND, supra note 151; DUMBING DOWN, supra
note 91.
In his recent books, Bellah has turned to excoriating postmodern religion for its
extreme individualism, selfishness, constant economic calculus, and stunted conversation.
See ROBERT BELLAM ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 129-30 (1991) (abortion); id. at 82-110
(commodification); id. at 111-44 (law and individual rights). THE GOOD SOCIETY is a
follow-up to their first collaborative book, ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART
(1985).
200. CHRIsTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFi IN AN
AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1979).
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popular book in this genre is The Sibling Society, by Robert Bly, which bemoans
the lack of "codes of responsibility, restraint and renunciation.
'2 °1
D. Popular Culture Images of the Postmodern Model
In popular culture, the Postmodern model is represented by syncretic
religious movements such as Scientology, New Age channeling, the community of
Auroville, 2 the Urantia fellowship,
203 and the Gaia environmental movement.M
4
Science and reason may or may not play a large role in postmodern religion; for
Heaven's Gate followers waiting in San Diego for the UFO following the comet
Hale-Bopp, precise astronomical calculations were combined with science fiction
beliefs about alien beings.2° 5 Canonical and non-canonical texts may be combined
201. ROBERT BLY, THE SIBLING SocImry 232 (1996).
202. Auroville is a world-famous ashram retreat near Pondicherry, a former
French colony on the east coast of India. Founded by Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950), it is a
utopian community with individuals from many nationalities. It was headed until recently
by his wife, "The Mother" and based on teachings and revelations by both figures. Sri
Aurobindo taught that the movement of two forces toward each other-the yogic mind from
below and enlightenment mind from above-resulted in the creation of a synthetic gnostic
individual capable of transcending her or his own individuality. See AUROBINDO, TIm LIFE
DiviNE, supra note 157; AUROBINDO, THE HUMAN CYCLE, supra note 157; AUROBINDO, THE
SYNTHESIS OF YOGA, supra note 157.
203. 'The origins of the "Book of Urantia," which is the basis of the Urantia
Fellowship (also called the Jesusonian Foundation) are unclear. A key figure is Dr. William
Sadler, a surgeon and psychiatrist who practiced in Chicago. For thirty years he was also a
lecturer in Pastoral Counseling at McCormick Theological Seminary. In the mid-1920s, Dr.
Sadler gathered together twenty or thirty friends who called themselves "the Forum," for
discussions on psychological and medical subjects. At their fourth meeting, Sadler told the
members that an unnamed member of the Forum was giving revelations from higher
intelligent beings in his sleep. The name of the person who channeled in his sleep has never
been verified by the Chicago Urantia Fellowship, but Martin Gardner claims that it was
Sadler's brother-in-law, Wilfred Kellogg. The results of these revelations was The Urantia
Book. See MARTIN GARDNER, URANTiA 35-38, 115-24 (1995). The Urantia Book has a
foreword that was "indited by an Orvonton Divine Counselor, Chief of the Corps of
Superuniverse Personalities assigned to portray on Urantia the truth concerning the Paradise
Deities and the universe of universes." THE URANTIA BOOK 17 (1998). Over 300,000 copies
of the Book have been printed and distributed in several languages. Interestingly, an off-
shoot of the original group, the Jesusonian Foundation, is now being sued in Federal Court
by the Chicago Urantia Foundation for violating the Chicago Foundation's valid copyrights
and trademarks. The new group claims that Urantia is their religion, and therefore the
Urantia Book cannot be copyrighted. See Religious Dispute: Urantia Readers Fight
Copyright Suit, THE DAILY CAMERA, OCT. 16, 1997, at lB.
204. This environmental movement is named after the Goddess of the Earth in
Greek mythology, Gaea or Gaia. It is based on the work of atmospheric scientist James
Lovelock, who has theorized that the entire earth is a single living entity in which each
animal, from protozoa to human being, represents a small part of the same, integrated larger
being called Gaia. See Britain Whole Earth Guru, N.Y. TIMES (MAGAZINE), Nov. 23, 1986,
at 67; MICHAEL ALLABY, A GUIDETO GAlA (1990).
205. The Heaven's Gate group was founded by Marshall Applewhite, a former
music professor, and his companion, Bonnie Lu Nettles, whose background was in nursing.
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as in The Urantia Book, which incorporates and expands on the Bible by adding
chapters back to the Big Bang origin of the universe, adding details to the Bible
itself and then projecting forward in time with chapters on the future.
Even the Supreme Being at the core of postmodern religion can be
multivalent and multivocal. For example, in a pop culture book entitled God Made
Easy, Patrice Karst renders this postmodern, multivalent view of God:
Wait! Before you get all charged up and your buttons pushed out of
shape.... The great news about God is that He has absolutely no ego
and will be perfectly content if you wish to call Him instead[:]
Goddess, Supreme Being, Heavenly Father (or even Big Dad),
Divine Mother, The Creator, Lord, Holy Spirit, Higher Power, The
Man Upstairs, A Loving Presence.. .(there's more!), Almighty,
Infinite Intelligence, Universal Energy, Cosmic Consciousness, The
Light Within, The Source, Something bigger than me. You get the
idea; just fill in the blank with any name you want... [large blank
space].2°6
When the Court uses the Postmodem model, functional replacements for religion
are given as explanations. Justice Black, for example, stated that other beliefs
might "function as a religion in the registrant's life."2w Therefore, religion or
aspects of religion come to be understood as functionally replaced by other
activities in society.208 There are several ways that the idea of functional
replacement can be understood in popular culture. First, if religion fulfills certain
particular functions for an individual-explaining the afterlife, coping with change
and stress, giving meaning to life, connecting to the supernatural, creating a peak
emotional experience-then these functions can be separated out and replaced by
other activities.2°0 Second, a non-religious activity can function as religion in a
person's life because it is a source of almost religious devotion. If one is devoted to
In March of 1997, Applewhite and 38 of his followers committed mass suicide in an attempt
to hitch a ride, via what they believed to be an extraterrestrial spacecraft, to a "Level Above
Human." Todd S. Purdum, Death in a Cult: The Scene, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 30 1997, at Al.
206. PATRICE KARST, GOD MADE EASY (1997) (pages not enumerated).
207. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970).
208. Functionalism has been traditionally understood to describe the ways in
which the parts of an organic whole complement each other and operate to preserve the
larger entity. A basic premise of functionalism theory is that every society has several
functional requisites that must be fulfilled and each part fulfills at least one of these basic
needs. In this sense, the functionalism of religion, then, would be an investigation into why
and how religion helps to preserve and maintain this society. Functionalist explanations of
this sort have been criticized as giving only utilitarian explanations and as heavily biased
toward integration of culture.
Functionalism as used in this article has a limited meaning related to the Supreme
Court's use of the term. Justice Black, in Welsh, describes the beliefs of the registrant as
functioning "like a religion" in his life. Id. at 339. Here the Court is stating that general
moral beliefs are the equivalent of, or fulfill the same role as, religious beliefs for this
individual. The Court assumes that religious beliefs or their equivalent are an important part
of the makeup of this individual.
209. Self-help/therapy books are perhaps the best example of this.
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playing basketball, riding a bicycle, losing weight, going to a therapist, then these
activities can "function as a religion" in an individual's life. Third, a non-religious
activity can function like a religion in that it occupies the time that was spent
attending to religion. It is in these three senses, then, that one reads of media
advertisements as religion, law as religion, environmentalism as religion, a hobby
as religion, or consumerism as religion.210 The media often employs these ideas of
functional replacement to promote consumer products. For example, Bike
magazine ran an issue on bicycling obsession as a "religion," with a cover
depicting the Madonna encircled by a bicycle gear.21
V. THE RELIGION OF THE FRAMERS AND CITY OF BOERNE V.
FLORES
Perhaps the most contested arena in religion clause jurisprudence is the
originalist argument over the Framer's conceptualization of religion. This model of
religion-the Framer's model-has been cited as authority in almost every
Supreme Court case since Reynolds as well as in most law review articles.
212
However, originalism is difficult to delineate as a model of religion, because it is a
site for contestation and each authority that cites it is using it to bolster a particular
current argument.
There is little doubt that most Americans in the eighteenth century were
very religious by current standards and experienced lives saturated with a strong
religious cosmology. However, they were also anti-clerical, anti-church, anti-
traditionalist, egalitarian, innovative, individualistic and scientific. Steven Smith
describes this tension, arguing that "reason," during the early period of the
founding generation, can be understood as the confluence of two distinct
traditions-a strong notion of the Providential Plan of God connected to "the
classical conception of Nature and the Great Chain of Being philosophy" and a
210. More than a metaphoric or referential use is meant here; rather, these uses
are understood as actual functional replacements for parts or all of religion. For fitness, see
RAY KYBARTAS & KENNETH Ross, FrrNESs iS RELIGION-KEEP THE FAITH (1997), endorsed
by the singer Madonna. For media advertisements as religion, see JAMES B. TwrrcHmi±,
ADCULT USA: TE TRIUMPH OF ADvERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1996). For law, see
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrUTIONAL FArrH (1988) and JOHN BRIGHAM, CULT OF THE
COURT (1987). Thomas Grey reviews the appropriateness of some of these ideas in law in
The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). For environmentalism, see TOM
HAYDEN, THE LAST GOSPEL OF THE EARTH (1996).
These three types of functional replacement are often combined: one is shopping
Sunday monin.g during the time one might have spent at church, one is "devoted" to
shopping ("shop 'til you drop"), and both shopping and purchasing items give meaning to
life by providing a peak emotional experience.
211. Mike Ferrentino, Acts of Faith, BIuE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1996, cover, 40-44.
212. See Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia and
its Intellectual Incoherence, NEw REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26: "We are all originalists
now. That is to say, most judges and legal scholars who want to remain within the
boundaries of respectable constitutional discourse agree that the original meaning of the
Constitution and its amendments has some degree of pertinence to the question of what the
Constitution means today."
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more modem "anti-traditional spirit of Cartesian rationalism" based in early Greek
philosophical positions.
213
The tension in this Framers' model appears to exist then between a strong
conceptualization of God and the religious life-in many ways similar to the
Traditional model-and a strong conceptualization of individuality and scientific
reason from the Modem and Postmodem models. And yet, for the Framers'
generation, this was less a tension than a revelation. The founding generation of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison was assisted in its endeavors by divine
inspiration from a God that acted intelligently in every moment of their lives.214
The larger Providential Plan meant that everything natural and manmade in the
universe had a position, a spot in the greater scheme of things, and creating the
Constitution was an act of deference to this divine plan. Here "the anti-traditional
spirit of Cartesian rationalism" and a divinely revealed religious cosmology were
part of the same blended worldview.
215
213. SMrrH, supra note 80, at 15.
214. The Framer's model comes closest perhaps to Robert Bellah's depiction of
"early modem religion," placed between "historic" religion and "modem" religion, based
on the Protestant Reformation. In this model, "the cosmological baggage of Medieval
Christianity is dropped as superstition," and there is a direct relation between the individual
and transcendent reality. Religious action now becomes
the whole of life. Special ascetic and devotional practices were dropped
as well as the monastic roles that specialized in them; instead the service
of God became a total demand in every walk of life. The stress was on
faith, an internal quality of the person, rather than on particular acts
clearly marked religious."
BELLAH, supra note 35, at 37. According to Bellah, early modem religion gave up the
notion of hierarchy in both its religious organizations and its symbolizing system. Bellah
joins Weber, Merton and others in attributing "a whole series of developments from
economics to science, from education to law" as service to God within the framework of the
Protestant Reformation. Id. at 38.
215. See SMrrH, supra note 139, at 48. As Smith notes about Jefferson's approach
to the Constitution, "The proper ends of society are not for human beings to choose; they
are given in the divine plan and the duty of government is simply to ascertain and conform
to that plan. Thus the Jeffersonian theory of government amounted to little more than
deference to the Creator's plan." Id. at 24. Smith describes the religious precepts of the
Framers' generation as consisting of three recurring ideas:
First, the world was created by an originating mind-the demiurge or,
more commonly, God-who by virtue of being perfectly good and self-
sufficient could not know envy and hence chose to confer existence on
everything that it could conceive of. Second, because everything that
exists is the product of the mind, not of chance, there is a reason why
everything exists in just the way that it does.... Third, because the
originating mind could not but choose to give existence to everything
that it could conceive of, the universe is in fact rich with the greatest
possible variety of entities.. .which together form a continuum from the
lowest and the most inanimate to the highest and most intelligent. This
hierarchy is the Great Chain of Being.
Id. at 17.
Milner Ball appears to take a somewhat similar position, stating that religious
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The complexities of these contrasts are rarely reflected in current legal
discourse, because the Court and the legal academy primarily employ the Framers'
model to bolster normative legal arguments to current questions. A recent example
is City of Boerne v. Flores,216 an opinion from the 1997 term, in which the Court
was presented with a suit challenging the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA").217 Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, concluded that in enacting
RFRA, Congress had exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
218
In a long dissent, Justice O'Connor takes up an originalist argument-the
appropriate model of religion both before and at the time of the framing of the
Constitution. She quotes several sources, including Madison's objections to
George Mason's proposed clause on religious liberty in the Virginia
Constitution. 2 19 She states:
To Madison then, duties to God were superior to duties to civil
authorities-the ultimate loyalty was owed to God above all.
Madison did not say that duties to the Creator are precedent only to
those laws specifically directed at religion nor did he strive simply
to prevent deliberate acts of persecution or discrimination. The idea
that civil obligations are subordinate to religious duty is consonant
with the notion that government must accommodate, where
possible, those religious practices that conflict with civil law.
220
Justice O'Connor gives concrete early examples of religious exemptions from
statutes in which the state had a compelling interest: Baptists and Quakers being
exempted from government-compelled tithes; Quakers being excused from having
to remove their hats in court; Jews being exempted from the requirements of state
marriage laws; and sectarian European immigrants being allowed to organize
whole towns in Georgia.221 Each of these examples can be linked to a particular
recent case in free exercise-Amish being forced to pay social security taxes,2 2 a
rabbi not being allowed to wear a yarmulke in the military, m Satmar Hasidim Jews
duties and liberty are necessarily prior to duties to the state. See Milner Ball, The Unfree
Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 41, 55 (1991).
216. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Boeme, a city located near San Antonio, Texas, has
several historic mission-style structures built in the early part of this century, including St.
Peter's Catholic Church. An application to enlarge the church to accommodate an increase
in the number of parishioners was denied by the city authorities under an historic landmark
ordinance. P.F. Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio, requested relief from the local
zoning restriction citing RFRA as a basis.
217. See supra note 3.
218. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-63.
219. See id. at 2183-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2182-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). These examples are taken from an
article by Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1469-71 (1990).
222. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
223. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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organizing themselves into a school district to receive government benefits224--and
together they imply a much wider zone of deference for religious action.
Although she presented the Framer's model of religion, Justice O'Connor
was not arguing that we should define the secular by the sacred once again. Nor
was she returning to Madison's understanding of civil obligations as subordinate to
religious duty. She did not even imply that the next time a case like Goldman or
Kiryas Joel comes before the Court, the Court should allow yarmulkes to be worn
in the military or the Hasidim to organize themselves as a school district. Instead,
she provided three principles for current interpretation of the Religion Clause of
the First Amendment: first, "these early leaders accorded religious exercise a
special constitutional status"2; second, "government interference in religious
practice was not to be lightly countenanced"226; and third, "the republic rested
largely on moral principles derived from religion."227 O'Connor concluded with the
following statement: 'The Religion Clauses of the Constitution represent a
profound commitment to religious liberty. Our Nation's Founders conceived of a
Republic receptive to voluntary religious expression, not of a secular society in
which religious expression is tolerated only when it does not conflict with a
generally applicable law." 22 What Justice O'Connor presented is a stronger
accomodationist stance. Justice O'Connor argued that the role of religion in
creating moral values be recognized in current legal discourse. As her dissent
indicates, the Framers' model, as the most important source of authority in current
religion clause jurisprudence, will remain a contested image even as it continues to
be used to bolster important current arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Religion clause jurisprudence has reached a state of incoherence that
leaves many uncomfortable, both on and off the Court. Attempts to resolve this
problem have resulted in numerous law review articles and searching, at times
fractious, opinions by the Court. Congress advocated a particular legal test with
RFRA that was struck down by the Court in City of Boerne with a separation of
powers argument.229 Frederick Gedickss has put it most succinctly: "few areas of
constitutional doctrine have succeeded like religion clause jurisprudence in
simultaneously maintaining internal inconsistency, ridicule by commentators, and
lack of popular support over such a long period of time."230 Explanations of the
current incoherence in terms of the need to observe neutrality between religions
and non-religions, the collision course between the free exercise and the
establishment clause, or the accomodationist versus separationist positions, have
224. See Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994).
225. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157.
226. Id. at 2185.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2185.
229. Id.
230. FREDERICK MARK GEDDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 3 (1995).
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not been successful. This Article argues that it is time to turn instead to a
consideration of the models of religion being projected by the Court and the legal
academy.
This article also takes a different methodological approach. The basic
premise is that we make categorizations based on idealized models of what we
"know" to exist in the world. Evidence for these idealized models can be abstracted
from linguistic and textual references such as Supreme Court opinions. Three basic
images of religion emerged: a Traditional integrated worldview religion, a Modem
secular religion and a New Age Postmodem religion.
The Framers' model is the area of greatest interest in the legal academy,
with numerous books published each year reinterpreting and representing the
models of religion of the Framers of the Constitution. While there is little doubt
that Americans in the eighteenth century were devoutly religious by current
standards, they were also egalitarian, individualistic and scientific. These two
different modes of thought, what Steve Smith has called the anti-traditional spirit of
Cartesian rationalism and a divinely revealed religion, were part of the same
blended worldview of the Framers.231 The Framer's model of religion is the most
contested because of its legitimating power, the difficulty of uncovering its
historical nature and its use to bolster current legal formulas.
Modeling the Court's characterizations of religion demonstrates a
coherency in the Court's opinions that is not available through doctrinal analysis.
The opinions of the Court are determined, to a large degree, by the stereotypical
images that the Justices have of the particular religion involved in a case.
These models also may have predictive value. First, if the Court has
generally viewed a particular religious institution as Postmodern in the past and the
opinions have been negative, a similar religion will have a heavier burden to carry
in proving its case regardless of the doctrinal arguments. The Native American
religion cases demonstrate this. Second, if the Court rules for a religion that it
would generally have characterized in a negative light, the opinion will often
correct that view by reinterpreting and describing the religion in a fa,<orable light
as in the Santeria religion case from Florida. Third, if the religion is an acceptable
Modem religion, the Court is much more likely to look upon it seriously and to
look carefully at other doctrinal issues involved. The use of the separation of
powers argument in last term's RFRA case shows this process. Finally, the
Framer's model of religion is used to highlight many different aspects of current
religious jurisprudence. It is employed most often as a rhetorical legitimation
device because it incorporates aspects of all three models.
It is important to begin a conversation in the legal academy about the
models of religion currently being used by the Supreme Court. These models are
shaped by historical doctrinal precedents, they are the subject of discussions in the
political and scholarly communities and they are rooted in intellectual ideas-
philosophical, political and sociological-as well as the representations of religion
in literature and popular culture. This Article argues that various religions pose
231. See SMiTH, supra note 80.
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very different kinds of jurisprudential problems for the Court. The Court decisions
fall into patterns in terms of idealized types of religion-Traditional, Modem and
Postmodern-rather than the particular religions themselves. Further inquiry into
the models of religion employed by the Court perhaps will provide idealized
coherency and predictive clarity to the discussion and aid in articulating, in Charles
Taylor's words, our common moral horizons.
